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Resumen
El agotamiento de las reservas de combustibles fo´siles, la creciente preocupacio´n
sobre el posible impacto a corto y mediano plazo de las emisiones de gases inver-
nadero en la sociedad y el medio ambiente, y las resultantes polı´ticas orientadas
hacia energı´as ma´s limpias y menor dependencia de combustibles fo´siles, han to-
dos puesto mayor presio´n en incrementar la capacidad de generar energı´a a partir de
fuentes renovables, de las cuales la energı´a eo´lica ha sido uno de los segmentos de
ma´s ra´pido desarrollo. Sin embargo, la naturaleza intermitente e impredecible de
estas fuentes, combinada con las limitaciones de la actual infraestructura de trans-
misio´n, se traduce en una cantidad significativa de energı´a eo´lica desperdiciada y
en que no se llegue a explotar adecuadamente la capacidad instalada de generacio´n.
El hidro´geno ha sido identificado como un vector energe´tico limpio para alma-
cenar la energı´a producida a partir de dichas fuentes variables. Adicionalmente, el
hidro´geno ha demostrado su factibilidad como combustible de cero emisiones para
uso en transporte, sea a trave´s de sistemas de combustio´n o celdas de combustible.
El uso del hidro´geno como mecanismo de almacenaje puede ayudar a absorber las
fluctuaciones en el suministro de energı´a, y potencialmente aumentar la utilizacio´n
de la capacidad disponible de generacio´n renovable.
El desarrollo de una infraestructura de produccio´n y distribucio´n de hidro´geno
es un tema de gran relevancia en la evaluacio´n de la viabilidad a largo plazo de este
vector energe´tico. Esta tesis doctoral se centra en las decisiones enfrentadas por
una empresa con capacidad de generacio´n de energı´a renovable, cuando tambie´n
le es posible producir hidro´geno por medio de electro´lisis conectada a la red.
Primero nos enfocamos en las decisiones de disen˜o de la cadena de suministro
para el productor; especı´ficamente, do´nde localizar las instalaciones de produccio´n
de hidro´geno, cua´nta capacidad construir en cada instalacio´n, y cua´nto hidro´geno
debe ser distribuido a instancias posteriores en la red.
Presentamos una serie de modelos de optimizacio´n para el disen˜o de la red de
produccio´n y distribucio´n, considerando el valor adicional creado por la produccio´n
de hidro´geno para una empresa generadora, incorporando la incertidumbre en el
suministro de energı´a renovable y en los precios de electricidad. La empresa opera
en un mercado regulado por una agencia externa con la capacidad de fijar precios
para el combustible de hidro´geno y establecer polı´ticas generales de servicio para
el mercado siendo considerado por el productor. Los Capı´tulos 2 y 3 de la tesis
esta´n enfocados en la problema´tica del productor bajo dos polı´ticas regulatorias de
distribucio´n: seleccio´n de mercados y asignacio´n proporcional.
Para abordar este problema presentamos procedimientos de solucio´n basados
en me´todos de generacio´n de columnas. A manera de fundamentar nuestro trabajo
en un contexto pra´ctico, en el Capı´tulo 4 implementamos nuestros modelos para
evaluar una futura red de combustible de hidro´geno en Espan˜a, y evaluamos el
efecto de los incentivos externos (subsidios) sobre las decisiones del productor,
permitie´ndonos ganar intuicio´n sobre co´mo dichos incentivos pueden ser puestos
en marcha para hacer viable una economı´a de hidro´geno.
Conclusiones y Extensiones
Esta tesis ha abordado el problema de maximizacio´n de ganancias enfrentado por
una empresa con capacidad de generacio´n de energı´a renovable, cuando cuenta con
la opcio´n de producir hidro´geno por medio de un proceso de electro´lisis conectada
a la red, para su distribucio´n a consumidores que lo utilizan como combustible al-
ternativo. Presentamos las propiedades de la funcio´n de ganancia esperada de la
empresa productora, adema´s de un me´todo exacto basado en generacio´n de colum-
nas para resolver este problema utilizando dos polı´ticas de distribucio´n alternativas.
A manera de fundamentar nuestro trabajo en un contexto pra´ctico, tambie´n pre-
sentamos un caso de estudio nume´rico que extiende esfuerzos anteriores de inves-
tigacio´n sobre una potencial cadena de suministros para combustible de hidro´geno
en Espan˜a. Nuestros resultados indican la prevalencia de produccio´n descentrali-
zada en el caso que el productor puede seleccionar los mercados a servir, inducido
por las distancias relativamente largas entre los puntos de demanda, que se acentu´a
en los escenarios de alta penetracio´n de mercado del combustible de hidro´geno y
de eficiencia futura del proceso de electro´lisis. Adicionalmente, en base al estado
actual de la tecnologı´a de produccio´n, nuestros experimentos computacionales in-
dican que un esquema de incentivos basado en reducir los costos de equipo e in-
fraestructura asumidos por los productores resultarı´a ma´s viable para la agencia
reguladora que la implementacio´n de un subsidio del precio del producto final, en
el caso que se desee lograr cobertura total de la demanda a nivel local y espacial
(satisfaccio´n completa de la demanda esperada para todos los nodos de la red).
Nuestro trabajo, a nuestro saber, es el primer modelo de disen˜o de redes que
incorpora incertidumbre tanto para el suministro y precio de energı´a ele´ctrica para
una empresa con capacidad dual de generacio´n eo´lica y produccio´n de hidro´geno,
y que proporciona un me´todo de solucio´n exacto que es notablemente eficiente y
adaptable a datos existentes del mercado de energı´a. Esto nos permite resolver
mu´ltiples escenarios para valorar el balance entre dos dimensiones de incentivos
monetarios de produccio´n.
La habilidad de combinar las capacidades de generacio´n y almacenaje de ener-
gı´a para maximizar ganancias podrı´a resultar crucial en incrementar la viabilidad
del hidro´geno como un vector energe´tico alternativo a gran escala, ası´ como mejo-
rar la utilizacio´n de las actuales (y futuras) infraestructuras de generacio´n de ener-
gı´a renovable. Por tal razo´n, consideramos este trabajo como una herramienta de
valor tanto para empresas que desean evaluar sus decisiones de disen˜o de red, y
tambie´n para los disen˜adores de polı´ticas que deseen estimar sistemas de incentivos
equitativos para la produccio´n de energı´a limpia. Demostramos co´mo el modelo
puede ser utilizado para estimar el costo monetario (para la agencia reguladora) de
las reducciones en emisiones derivadas del uso de combustible limpio en el sector
de transporte (vehı´culos particulares para movilizacio´n de personas), ası´ como el
costo de asegurar una adopcio´n equitativa del combustible alternativo a lo largo y
ancho de un a´rea geogra´fica por medio de una polı´tica de asignacio´n proporcional.
Nuestro enfoque no consiste en hacer sugerencias especı´ficas de polı´ticas pu´blicas,
sino proveer un marco matema´tico a los participantes del sector que les permita
obtener una representacio´n ma´s precisa de los resultados inducidos por un con-
junto de polı´ticas, posibilitando una comparacio´n adecuada con otras tecnologı´as
de almacenaje y transporte de energı´a.
Existen muchas direcciones interesantes en las cuales este trabajo puede ser
extendido. Primero, otras polı´ticas alternativas de distribucio´n pueden ser explo-
radas para balancear rentabilidad (para el productor), capital y costo social (para
la sociedad), y costos de incentivos (para el regulador); por ejemplo, la inclusio´n
de niveles de servicio mı´nimos y/o diferenciados por ubicacio´n. Dichas polı´ticas
podrı´an afectar la estructura del problema y requerir el uo de metodologı´as dife-
rentes a las propuestas en esta tesis.
Segundo, nuestro trabajo esta´ basado en un esquema zonal de precios, una su-
posicio´n que podrı´a ser relajada para considerar precios nodales con posible corre-
lacio´n entre nodos.
En el a´mbito de la polı´tica energe´tica, la utilizacio´n del modelo para un ana´lisis
ma´s exhaustivo de los efectos regulatorios y de precios serı´a de gran valor para
entender con mayor detalle el efecto de los esquemas de incentivos cuando los
para´metros de mercado (precios, demanda) y tecnologı´a (eficiencia, costos de ca-
pacidad) esta´n sujetos a cambio. Dichos cambios podrı´an deberse a mejoras en
la tecnologı´a de electro´lisis o de compresio´n/licuefaccio´n, precios o disponibili-
dad de agua para electro´lisis (un punto relevante en ciertas regiones geogra´ficas,
incluyendo Espan˜a), o cambios a largo plazo en el comportamiento estoca´stico de
los precios de energı´a causados por la introduccio´n de almacenaje a gran escala
en el sistema energe´tico. Esto resultarı´a en un marco analı´tico para evaluar la asig-
nacio´n de recursos para el desarrollo de vectores energe´ticos limpios, incluyendo el
desarrollo de tecnologı´as de produccio´n, infraestructuras, programas de incentivo
al consumidor, disponibilidad de insumos, y estrategias alternativas de mitigacio´n
de emisiones de carbono.
Una extensio´n directa de nuestro modelo en el campo de disen˜o de polı´ticas
consiste en incorporar dina´micas de mercados de emisiones como parte de las
funciones de utilidad de los participantes del sistema. Si al productor se le per-
mite recibir cre´dito por las emisiones reducidas debido al desplazamiento de com-
bustibles fo´siles de la mezcla de combustibles para transporte, entonces podrı´a re-
ducirse la dependencia en incentivos (subsidios) por parte del regulador para el de-
sarrollo sostenible de una infraestructura de produccio´n-distribucio´n de hidro´geno.
U¨c¸tug˘ et al. (2011) llevan a cabo un ana´lisis de viabilidad incorporando el co-
mercio de emisiones de carbono para una planta de produccio´n de hidro´geno uti-
lizando un proceso de reformacio´n de metano. Ellos muestran que el comercio
de emisiones puede ser una herramienta financiera efectiva (en cuanto a costos)
para plantas de produccio´n de hidro´geno durante sus primeros an˜os de operacio´n,
cuando el retorno a la inversio´n es bajo y el riesgo asumido por los productores es
alto. Adicionalmente, los resultados de Aflaki y Netessine (2012) indican que los
impuestos sobre el carbono por sı´ solos podrı´an desalentar la inversio´n en capaci-
dad de generacio´n renovable. En ese sentido, serı´a interesante ver el efecto de in-
tegrar hidro´geno (como un producto final, en vez de ser u´nicamente un mecanismo
de almacenaje a corto plazo o para desplazamiento temporal de carga dentro del
sistema) en su marco analı´tico para evaluar si el efecto que detectan se mantiene.
Finalmente, tratamos a las instalaciones como entes aceptadores de precios,
que es razonable cuando la congestio´n en la red no es un factor crı´tico (por ejem-
plo, debido a la prevalencia del viento en horarios nocturnos –fuera de las horas
pico). Como parte de la meta de una tecnologı´a de almacenaje es incrementar la
penetracio´n de energı´as renovables en los mercados energe´ticos, es evidente que
los efectos de la congestio´n de la red ameritan consideracio´n en mercados de alta
penetracio´n de generacio´n eo´lica.
Nuestra intuicio´n es que el considerar la ubicacio´n de las instalaciones de ge-
neracio´n y la congestio´n en la red crearı´a una necesidad de ubicar cierta capaci-
dad de produccio´n cerca de los parques eo´licos, pues dichos puntos de almacenaje
permitirı´an desacoplar de manera puntual los sistemas de transmisio´n ele´ctrica y
distribucio´n de hidro´geno durante los perı´odos de congestio´n. Con los parques
eo´licos usualmente localizados en a´reas de baja densidad poblacional, este tipo de
produccio´n localizada podrı´a ser rentable para servir nichos de mercado, tales como
pequen˜as aglomeraciones urbanas cerca de los parques eo´licos que generalmente
serı´an dejadas fuera de los planes piloto de combustibles alternativos, creando una
va´lvula de escape para la generacio´n excedente en perı´odos de mayor demanda,
mientras provee un beneficio social a trave´s de la adopcio´n de tecnologı´as limpias
en a´reas que de otra forma serı´an ignoradas debido a su relativamente bajo nivel de
demanda.
Otra consecuencia de relajar el supuesto de instalaciones aceptadoras de pre-
cios son las dina´micas de retroalimentacio´n (feedback) causadas por un incre-
mento en generacio´n renovable, dada la presencia de tecnologı´as de almacenaje
(sea hidro´geno o algu´n otro vector), cuando la penetracio´n de renovables es alta.
Zhou et al. (2012) resaltan este punto y sugieren analizar el efecto combinado de
mu´ltiples parques eo´licos e instalaciones de almacenaje sobre los precios de elec-
tricidad. El extender nuestro modelo para hacer que los precios de energı´a (un
para´metro que afecta las decisiones de localizacio´n y capacidad) sean dependien-
tes en la capacidad total de almacenaje vı´a hidro´geno involucrarı´a una formulacio´n
ma´s compleja para capturar esta dina´mica, que no serı´a factible solucionar uti-
lizando las metodologı´as sugeridas en esta tesis. Dado que parte del propo´sito de
almacenar energı´a es incrementar la factibilidad de los proyectos de generacio´n
renovable, esta relacio´n serı´a de intere´s para expandir el modelo.
La utilidad de nuestro trabajo trasciende el campo de sistemas energe´ticos.
Consideren una empresa tomando una decisio´n estrate´gica de produccio´n y dis-
tribucio´n asociada a un surtido de bienes que comparten un mismo (potencialmente
perecedero) insumo, donde el insumo puede ser vendido directamente a un mer-
cado a un precio que vara de manera incierta, y donde los productos finales pueden
ser obtenidos mediante procesos de produccio´n compartidos por subconjuntos de
productos. Ese tipo de escenario guarda ciertas similitudes estructurales con nues-
tro problema. En este contexto, las decisiones de localizacio´n y capacidad esta´n
relacionadas con la seleccio´n de los procesos de transformacio´n; mientras que el
problema de asignacio´n de mercados podrı´a relacionarse con cua´nta capacidad, si
alguna, debe ser asignada a cada producto, con los costos de transporte represen-
tando los costos de transformacio´n para cada par producto - proceso, con la polt´ica
de seleccio´n de mercados actuando como mecanismo de filtracio´n para que le em-
presa escoja que´ productos finales debe producir. El modelo puede ser adaptado
para representar los precios de los diferentes productos finales, en contraste con
un precio u´nico (como es nuestro caso). En el contexto de diferentes tecnologı´as
de produccio´n para industrias con insumos de alto costo (metales preciosos para
semiconductores), volatilidad de precio (procesos con alto consumo de energı´a) o
naturaleza perecedera (insumos agrı´colas con productos derivados de mayor dura-
bilidad pero menor valor), un modelo de este tipo ciertamente podrı´a ser aplicable.
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Abstract
The depletion of fossil fuel reserves, rising concerns over the potential short- and
long-term impact of carbon emissions on society and the environment, and the re-
sulting policies aiming for cleaner energy and reduced fossil-fuel dependance, have
all placed greater pressure in increasing generation capacity for new renewables, of
which wind power has been one of the fastest developing segments. However, the
intermittent and unpredictable nature of these sources, coupled with limitations in
current transmission infrastructure, translates into significant amounts of wind en-
ergy being curtailed and the full potential of generation capacity not being realized.
Hydrogen has been identified as a clean carrier to store the energy produced
from such volatile sources. Additionally, it has been proven to be a feasible zero-
emission fuel for transportation, either in combustion systems or through the use of
fuel cells. Using hydrogen as a storage mechanism would help absorb fluctuations
in the energy supply, and potentially increase the utilization of existing renewable
generation capacity.
The development of a hydrogen production and distribution infrastructure is
a most relevant issue in evaluating the long-term viability of hydrogen as an en-
ergy carrier. This work addresses the decisions faced by a firm with renewable
energy generation capacity, when also able to produce hydrogen by means of grid-
connected electrolysis. We first focus on the supply chain design decisions for the
producer; namely, where to locate the hydrogen production facilities, how much
capacity to build at each facility, and how hydrogen should be distributed down-
stream.
We present a series of optimization models for the design of the production-
distribution network, considering the additional profits of hydrogen production for
an energy generating firm, incorporating the uncertainty of renewable energy sup-
ply and electricity prices. The firm operates in a market regulated by an external
agency with the capability of setting hydrogen prices and establishing general ser-
vice policies for the market under consideration by the producer.
For addressing this problem, we make use of solution procedures based on
column generation. As a way of grounding our work in a practical context, we
implement our models in assessing a future hydrogen network in Spain and evaluate
the effect of incentives (subsidies) on the firm’s decisions, gaining insights on how
such incentive schemes can be set in place to make a hydrogen economy viable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The emphasis placed in recent years on the use of renewable energy sources has
had a significant effect on the share of investments in energy generation capacity
around the world. One of the fastest growing segments in the generation portfolio
has been that of wind powered electricity production (GWEC 2008). However, as
happens with other renewable power sources, supply presents a significant degree
of uncertainty –in the case of wind power, the intermittence of wind patterns. Ag-
gregated, the supply of energy from wind can be predicted to a significant degree;
but the absence of an economically-viable, standardized, and massively adopted
energy storage mechanism and the limitations on transmission grid capacity causes
this variability to translate into short-term shutdown of wind energy generation to
avoid the risk of overloading the network, resulting in waste of potential energy
supply.
Although regulations exist for minimizing the curtailing of electricity generated
from renewable sources (as reference, European Union 2009) by giving dispatch
priority to installations using such sources for generation, curtailing of electricity
from wind generation is still significant due to network capacity issues and the nat-
ural prevalence of wind during off-peak periods. For instance, Rogers et al. (2010)
describe wind curtailing practices around the world, indicating that for the spe-
cific case of Spain, up until 2009 the majority of curtailments were due to network
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congestion issues, while since late 2009 the majority were due to wind generation
exceeding the minimum load.
Hence, the use of a storable clean energy carrier, such as hydrogen, is critical in
markets where a significant portion of the energy generation capacity comes from
intermittent renewable sources (Jørgensen and Ropenus 2008).
A potential hydrogen market represents an opportunity for wind farm owners
and other renewable electricity producers to obtain additional profits, as hydrogen
can act as a load balancing mechanism to mitigate the fluctuations on the supply
side by allowing for storage of energy output (U.S. Department of Energy 2009b).
More importantly, such a balancing mechanism would lead to better integration
of renewable generation capacity to the energy supply portfolio, higher utilization
of existing (and improved viability of future) generation infrastructures, and lower
dependence on fossil fuels –both as energy generation feedstocks and transporta-
tion energy carriers— with its consequent effects on the environment and energy
security.
Different alternatives have been evaluated for storing surplus energy; for in-
stance, compressed air energy storage (U.S. Department of Energy 2009a, Den-
holm and Sioshansi 2009) and high-capacity batteries (Dell and Rand 2001, Wald
2007, Saran et al. 2010). A particular factor creating interest in the development of
a hydrogen-based economy is its direct applicability as a substitute for fossil-based
fuels in transportation (Ogden 1999, Turner 1999), a sector which as of 2005 was
responsible for about two thirds of oil consumption in the United States of Amer-
ica, and 55% of oil consumption worldwide (Hirsch et al. 2005). Furthermore,
hydrogen produced from a renewable source represents a sustainable carrier for
delivering clean energy to consumers (Wang 2002).
Designing the supply chain for the production and distribution of hydrogen is
then an important task in evaluating the feasibility of incorporating this energy car-
rier into the energy system. This thesis focuses on the decision faced by a firm with
the capability of generating electricity from a renewable source, when a hydrogen
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market exists, providing the firm with the option of building facilities for producing
hydrogen using a grid-connected electrolysis process. The firm needs to select the
location and size of the electrolysis plants, as well as the markets to be served from
each plant.
This work is motivated from a research project funded by the Spanish Ministry
of Science and Innovation in direct collaboration with Acciona Energy –one of
the world’s leading wind power developers and operators— to design a future hy-
drogen supply network for Spain (Goentzel 2010). In that project some modeling
choices were made to employ averages for representing uncertain parameters, with
the objective of the project being the design of the production-distribution network
that minimized the cost of hydrogen delivered at demand points.
This thesis builds on that work by explicitly incorporating the stochasticity of
energy supply and electricity prices to the decision model and addressing the de-
cision problem from a profit maximization viewpoint, attempting to recreate the
business conditions faced by firms in the renewable energy sector.
There are four main contributions from our work. First, we incorporate two
critical attributes of renewable sources and power systems in the design of supply
networks for clean energy carriers: the uncertainty of supply generated by intermit-
tent sources, and the fluctuations of energy prices caused by supply-demand imbal-
ance and the cost profile of generation technologies. Second, we treat the problem
from the point of view of an integrated electricity-generating/hydrogen-producing
firm, a departure from previous works focusing on hydrogen production as the sole
economic activity. This setting aligns with the interest of power generation firms
of increasing the effective utilization of existing renewable generation capacity, by
means of an energy storage technology that would allow them to time-shift gen-
eration and reduce the amount of wind curtailment. Third, we frame the problem
in the context of profit maximization, and show how focusing only on minimizing
transportation costs fails to find an optimal (and in some instances, even a good)
solution. To address this shortcoming we propose solution methods based on col-
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umn generation. We use a static approach for the problem, with our model being a
representation of a system operating in steady state over a long time horizon (i.e.,
when a stable demand for hydrogen exists in the market due to wider adoption of
hydrogen-powered internal combustion engine or fuel-cell vehicles, and the pro-
cess yield of the technology used for production –including compression and/or
liquefaction— is also stable). Finally, we aim to provide policy makers with some
understanding of the effect of regulatory decisions, including hydrogen prices and
subsidies for producers, on the producer’s profitability. Providing the right incen-
tives or conditions for making hydrogen production financially viable on a large
scale is an important aspect in properly designing the supply system, as this would
enable the right amount of investment to be placed on production and distribution
infrastructure, as well as increasing the potential of expanding renewable genera-
tion capacity.
1.1 Research Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to create a model that provides a decision maker
with answers to the following questions:
• Given the capability of producing hydrogen using renewable energy, how
should the hydrogen production-distribution network be designed? Specif-
ically, how many electrolysis plants are required, where should they be lo-
cated, how much capacity should they have, and which demand locations are
to be served from each facility?
• What is the monetary gain from introduction hydrogen production capability
to a firm that already obtains revenues from the sale of electricity to an energy
market?
• What is the effect on firm profits and network structure for different levels of
stable hydrogen prices set by an external regulatory agency? How do profits
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and network structure change when the regulator attempts to incentivize the
firm by assuming a portion of facility-associated costs?
• What is the effect on firm profits when the regulator attempts to enforce spa-
tial (geographic) coverage of demand locations by means of a strict distribu-
tion policy? Consequently, what would be the cost of implementing such a
distribution policy for the regulator, if the same level of production is wished
to be maintained?
• What is the cost for the regulator (and, consequently, for society) of achieving
a certain level of environmental benefits derived from reducing fossil-fuel
emissions?
Aside from the direct answers that can be obtained from the model, there is a
more general purpose we hope to achieve with this work. We believe such a mod-
eling framework can be used, by stakeholders from the public and private sectors
alike, for assessing the long-term potential of a hydrogen economy and comparing
this potential to that of other energy storage and emission reduction/control tech-
nologies. We consider the integration of supply chain design and policy issues to
be an important element in understanding the tradeoffs associated to the introduc-
tion of future energy technologies, and an element that can aid in creating policies
which align the interests of industry with those of society.
We point out that it is not an objective of this thesis to perform a comprehensive
numerical study of every possible scenario that could arise in an uncertain and
ever-evolving energy landscape. It is our goal to provide a quantitative approach
to address this particular problem, and understand (on a methodological level) the
implications and challenges of incorporating uncertainty to the analysis of energy
storage technologies, while also gaining some general insights into the properties
of this complex decision problem. As greater knowledge is gathered on the values
of the parameters associated to hydrogen production technology, the tool would
represent a foundation which could then be adapted to perform such numerical
studies.
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1.2 Literature Review
From a methodological point of view, this thesis is set in the broad field of location
analysis and supply chain design. From an application perspective, it incorporates
technical and economic aspects of energy systems to represent the market and op-
erational conditions faced by decision makers in our problem.
This section will present a summary of the extant literature to which we can
relate our problem, based on three main intersecting themes: energy economics,
location models, and hydrogen network design. In particular, the last theme will
highlight previous research addressing the design of hydrogen distribution systems,
but differing in the specific settings and assumptions on which the problem is based.
1.2.1 Energy economics
Some works in this field have relevance in motivating and establishing a proper
context for our work. One stream of literature addresses the economic implications
of further integrating renewable sources to the energy system. Owen (2004) and
Owen (2006) find that renewable technologies can be competitive with generation
from fossil feedstocks if the estimates of environmental damage from the combus-
tion of these fossil fuels is internalized into the price of the resulting electricity.
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) address the environmental and financial sustain-
ability of wind energy based on trends of improving generation technology and
increasing costs of fossil fuels.
Aflaki and Netessine (2012) study the relationship between electricity market
liberalization, carbon taxes and intermittency of renewables, and suggest that ef-
forts in reducing source intermittency (by means of a storage technology) might
prove more effective in incentivizing capacity investments in renewable generation
than just the use of carbon taxes. The main challenge in addressing the natural
intermittency of renewable sources (and, consequently, one of the main roadblocks
for a more rapid growth of renewable generation capacity) is the lack of a large-
scale, cost-efficient storage technology.
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Although a large stream of literature focuses on the technical aspects of energy
storage technologies, we will only highlight those works that shed a light on the
strategic implications of incorporating these storage technologies to the existing
energy system. For a review of the technical characteristics of different storage
technologies, the reader may refer to the concise account by Ibrahim et al. (2008)
or a more comprehensive reference in Huggins (2010).
Significant research has been done evaluating the management of storage for
wind energy under particular settings (see: Black and Strbac 2007, Denholm and
Sioshansi 2009, Sioshansi 2010, Zhou et al. 2012). In particular, Zhou et al. (2012)
assess the effect of storage in the monetary value of a revenue-maximizing wind
farm, caused by reducing wind curtailment and time-shifting generation, pointing
out that increased storage capacity might reduce the average amount of wind energy
sold when transmission capacity is abundant. Kim and Powell (2011) address the
advance energy commitment problem faced by wind farms in the presence of finite
storage capacity. Although their work is not in the context of network design, their
model does share with ours the consideration of stochastic prices and supply.
Finally, Sundararagavan and Baker (2012) perform a comparative analysis of
different types of storage systems, including niquel-cadium and lithium-ion bat-
teries, flywheels, pumped hydro, and compressed air energy storage. The authors
evaluate the costs of these different technologies, and proceed to identify the char-
acteristics that affect whether they can become viable. Notably, hydrogen is not
one of the alternatives considered.1 We should note that the paper mentioned fo-
cuses on storage for the purpose of load shifting, delaying the delivery of renewable
energy from off-peak periods (where most generation naturally occurs) to peak de-
mand periods; meaning that any hydrogen produced solely for that purpose would
require reconversion to electricity for delivery, a process that is currently not viable
from the point of view of energy efficiency losses. This setting is then different
1The author of this thesis had a direct conversation with the second author of that paper at the
INFORMS Annual Meeting on October 14, 2012. When asked about this omission, the response
was that their initial analysis resulted in a very high cost for hydrogen given the state of production
technology.
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from ours, as we evaluate hydrogen as an end-product, but we choose to mention it
given some materials .
Given our consideration of uncertain energy prices as part of the model, we
refer the reader to the extensive literature in energy pricing and its relationship
to network congestion, supply and demand (Rivier and Pe´rez-Arriaga 1993, Stoft
2002, Barquı´n 2006).
1.2.2 Location analysis and supply chain design
The existing work in location analysis is quite extensive and has evolved signif-
icantly over the years. For a comprehensive overview of discrete location mod-
els, the reader may refer to Labbe´ et al. (1995), Daskin (1995) and Drezner and
Hamacher (2004).
Over time, many authors have reviewed the extant literature for specific streams
of location science research. Hale and Moberg (2003) provide a broad account of
research in the field since its origins. Klose and Drexl (2005) review the litera-
ture in the context of distribution network design, focusing on continuous location
models, network location models, mixed-integer programming models, and appli-
cations. Snyder (2006) focuses on facility location under uncertainty, differenti-
ating between stochastic and robust location problems. A more recent review by
Melo et al. (2009) explores the literature in the context of supply chain manage-
ment, comparing models in terms of the supply chain decisions (apart from those
pertaining to location and allocation) incorporated to the models.
We highlight the relevance of previous research incorporating uncertainty to lo-
cation models (e.g., Mirchandani 1980, Weaver and Church 1983, Louveaux 1986,
Berman et al. 2007, to name a few). The chapter by Berman and Krass (2002)
provides in-depth coverage of stochastic location models. The seminal works of
Hakimi (1964, 1965) play an important role in establishing the discrete nature of
the solution space, enabling the use of the solution techniques shown in the thesis.
Finally, given the combinatorial nature of location problems, relevant references on
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networks and combinatorial optimization are fundamental for analyzing the struc-
tural properties of our problem (Cook et al. 1997, Schrijver 2003, Larson and Odoni
2007), while specific works in decomposition and column generation techniques
(Dantzig and Wolfe 1960, Barnhart et al. 1998, Lu¨bbecke and Desrosiers 2005)
form a strong base for the methodology used for solving the models presented. Al-
though here we only mention them in passing, in the methodological section of this
thesis we will directly highlight specific results or properties that have appeared in
the literature whenever we find it relevant.
1.2.3 Hydrogen system design
Ogden (1999) and Ogden et al. (1999) discuss possible infrastructure configura-
tions for production and delivery of hydrogen, without explicit modeling of the
location-allocation problem. Yang and Ogden (2007) focus on determining op-
timal (minimum cost) hydrogen delivery modes from a large central production
plant assuming a centralized production scheme, focusing on the hydrogen trans-
portation portion of the supply chain (from the central plant to a central warehouse,
or to a network of demand points). They apply an idealized city model to represent
the spatial density of population; however, they do not consider the economic im-
plications of (deterministic) hydrogen prices or (uncertain) energy prices in their
distribution model.
Some works explicitly incorporate the location-allocation decisions to their
problems. Dagdougui (2012) reviews the extant literature in hydrogen supply
chains, highlighting the different approaches used in the planning of hydrogen in-
frastructure.
Almansoori and Shah (2006) present a snapshot model for the design of a hy-
drogen supply chain, formulating it as a deterministic mixed-integer linear program
(MILP) and applying the model for the case of Great Britain. Almansoori and Shah
(2009) extend their first paper by allowing decisions in multiple periods and mul-
tiple energy sources for hydrogen production (natural gas, oil, coal, biomass and
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solar power). Notably, the quantity of available sources is deterministic, which may
partially be justified given they do not consider wind power as one of the sources
in their model. Kim et al. (2008) introduce demand uncertainty and model a hy-
pothetical Korean hydrogen supply chain. Finally, Huang et al. (2010b) introduce
a stochastic dynamic programming model for evaluating the timing and location
of hydrogen production sites when hydrogen demand is considered uncertain and
present a case study for Northern California. These works focus on hydrogen as the
standalone economic activity, and do not incorporate the potential tradeoffs faced
by a firm using its own saleable generated electricity for hydrogen production as
part of a profit-maximizing model.
Brey et al. (2006) present a multi-objective deterministic optimization model
for the gradual rollout of hydrogen as a substitute for existing transportation fuels
in Spain. They include a cost-minimization objective, a component for minimizing
the deviations of production from the regional preferences for particular sources
for hydrogen production, and an environmental equity component in their model
to induce that environmental benefits of fuel replacement reach all regions to a
certain extent. Their reasoning for this environmental equity criterion is that na-
tional targets could be possibly achieved by focusing on a greater adoption rate on
a few locations with significant renewable energy potential (thereby focusing the
environmental benefits of emission reduction on those locations), while pollution
reduction has greater utility in regions with higher initial pollution levels; thus, they
wish to model a mechanism that encourages production (and realizes benefits) on
a more balanced manner.
Han et al. (2012) propose the design of a hydrogen distribution network incor-
porating differentiated pricing across regions, by means of a MILP. Note that, in
the spirit of Almansoori and Shah (2006), all parameters are deterministic and, al-
though framed as a profit-maximizing model, hydrogen is treated as the sole source
of revenues for the firm and not a complementary activity to electricity production.
Ball et al. (2007) develop a model for assessing the deployment of infrastructure
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to support a future hydrogen-based transport system in Germany through the year
2030. Tzimas et al. (2007) estimate the infrastructure requirements for achieving
three different degrees of penetration for hydrogen fuel at the European level. They
do so by employing general guidelines for calculating infrastructure requirements,
without explicitly modeling the configuration of the (optimal) required network.
Their work is meant to provide benchmark figures for the magnitude of investment
required to deploy a EU-level hydrogen infrastructure up to the year 2050. De Wolf
et al. (2009) focus on the optimal design of a pipeline network for transportation of
hydrogen fuel, when the supply points for hydrogen are known; i.e., the locations
of production plants are fixed, not part of the firm’s decision.
Giannakoudis et al. (2010) use a stochastic annealing algorithm to address the
optimization of a power generation system with hydrogen storage and renewable
energy sources; however, the problem does not consider spatial optimization of the
hydrogen production and distribution network as part of the model, with the role
of hydrogen storage in their context being an input for a fuel cell that will feed
electrical power back into the system when required.
Parker et al. (2010) present a network design model for the production of hydro-
gen from biomass (agricultural residues). The formulate the profit-maximization
location-allocation problem as a mixed-integer, non-linear program, with differ-
ent hydrogen prices for the demand points. The complexity of the problem forces
them to make some assumptions regarding the viability of pipeline links to reduce
the number of binary variables. They apply their methodology to the case of Cali-
fornia’s Sacramento Valley, using rice straw as feedstock for the biomass process.
The difference in structure from our problem comes from their use of deterministic
costs for feedstocks.
Finally, it’s worth mentioning that the design of supply chains for biofuels can
be considered close in nature to our work. Chen and Fan (2012) use a mixed-
integer stochastic programming model to address a problem with multiple scenar-
ios of supply and demand, to capture some of the uncertainty associated to feed-
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stock availability, aiming to minimize the total costs of capital investments, feed-
stock procurement and transportation, and distribution of end-product. Huang et
al. (2010a) look at a multistage mixed-integer linear program to minimize the total
system cost of building and operating a network of biorefineries under determin-
istic parameters over a finite planning horizon. In both cases, the authors present
numerical case studies for the state of California. Papapostolou et al. (2011) for-
mulate a mixed-integer linear programming model and implement it for the case of
Greece. A review of research in biofuel and petroleum-based supply chains can be
found in An et al. (2006).
Comparing these previous works, we can observe that the main differentiators
of this paper from the existing literature are: the explicit modeling of network de-
sign problem for a hydrogen producer, coupled with the integration of stochastic
energy prices to the profitability analysis, as part of a profit-maximization model
where the supply is also uncertain. All those elements are not presented as part
of a single model in any of the works reviewed and, to the best of our knowledge,
in the literature. Dagdougui (2012) emphasizes, as part of the author’s overview
of hydrogen supply chain literature, that the literature has been heavily populated
by models minimizing the cost or the environmental impacts of hydrogen supply
chains, with fewer studies focusing on risk issues in the design of this infrastruc-
ture. Additionally, the author states a need to do further research on hydrogen
supply chains operating on clean feedstocks, including renewable energy sources.
Thus, we can consider our work to fill a present gap in the body of research in
hydrogen supply chains.
We do acknowledge that there are many other elements presented (or at times
only mentioned) by other authors that could be incorporated as extensions of our
model, such as multi-period decisions with demand growth to simulate adoption.
Thus, the literature presented serves not only as comparison for placement of our
model in the field, but also as motivator for identifying future research directions
where our integrated framework can be enhanced to incorporate other relevant ef-
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fects. We will identify those research directions in §5.2.
1.3 Structure
The remainder of this work will be divided in four main sections, the scope of each
is briefly introduced below.
• Chapter 2: We address the supply chain design problem faced by the pro-
ducer, under a distribution policy that enforces full local coverage at the (po-
tential) expense of not achieving full spatial coverage. In virtue of our prob-
lem having a profit-maximizing objective, the producer focuses on trading
off the addition of new markets to her coverage area.
• Chapter 3: We formulate the problem under a different distribution policy,
where the regulator prioritizes full spatial coverage at a uniform service level
across the network (which may be less than 100%, indicating full local cov-
erage might not be achieved). The producer’s tradeoff, in the context of this
policy, shifts towards increasing her presence in all local markets at the same
pace.
• Chapter 4: We shift our attention towards the effect of the actions of a (well-
intentioned) regulatory agency, which can control the price of hydrogen to be
received by the producer, as well as set policies on how the producer shall
allocate production to satisfy the regulator’s plans of adoption of hydrogen
technology in his region of jurisdiction. This regulator also has the option
of providing a monetary incentive to the producer by either assuring the pro-
ducer a captive profit from marginal hydrogen prices (i.e., a price subsidy)
or by partially covering the costs of building capacity in the network (i.e., an
equipment subsidy). We incorporate these incentives in our network model,
and use the proposed solution procedures to evaluate the impact of these in-
centives in the producer’s profitability and network configuration. The main
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purpose is evaluating these incentive systems as part of an energy policy
framework, using an actual example of a potential hydrogen distribution net-
work as a basis for evaluation. To offer a practical scenario for this analysis,
we present a case study for a potential future hydrogen network in Spain,
noting that the model is suitable for any geographic region, independent of
size, where energy prices can be treated as those of a single zone (see §2.2
for an explanation of our model assumptions).
• Chapter 5: This final section presents a summary of our results and lists
potential paths for extending our model to capture other elements of energy
system design.
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Chapter 2
Decision Under a Market Selection
Policy
We start by defining the first distribution policy to be covered in this thesis.
Definition 1. A market selection policy consists of the following conditions:
• The producer can choose to serve a subset from a finite list of locations, each
with an associated hydrogen demand.
• If a location is chosen for service, then the firm commits to building the
necessary capacity to satisfy the projected demand of each location; i.e.,
deliberate partial exclusion of a market in the planning stage is not allowed.
The interpretation for this policy is that full local coverage of hydrogen demand
at a given node takes precedence over the spatial coverage of hydrogen distribution
at the network level. Intuitively, a market selection policy would –all other elements
being the same– be preferred by potential producers over any alternative strategy,
as it allows prioritizing the markets of greater revenue potential.
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Figure 2-1: Components of a wind-hydrogen energy system (Source: Korpås and Greiner
2008). Shaded boxes represent the components considered in our model.
2.1 Problem Description
In our problem, the production of hydrogen using electricity generated from wind
energy creates a market complementary to that of electricity. Hydrogen will be
transported to downstream depots and dispatched to final consumers at forecourt
stations. A representative wind power generation and hydrogen production system
is depicted in Figure 2-1 (Korpås and Greiner 2008), where the components that
we include in our decision model are highlighted.
We will focus on the location of the electrolysis plants, which shall have in-
tegrated storage capacity, and will assume the firm does not purchase hydrogen
from an outside source for serving its customer requirements (represented by the
hydrogen load). Note there is also the possibility of the producer storing the en-
ergy as hydrogen, and then transform it into electricity using a hydrogen-fueled
generator when electricity prices make it profitable, although this last possibility
will not be explicitly considered within the scope of this work. Note the role of a
hydrogen-fueled generator in the system would be relevant in the case the market
for hydrogen as an end-product is small in comparison to the load-shifting needs
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of renewable generators, although that would involve even more energy losses (35
to 65%1) in the reconversion. Thus, use of hydrogen for storage and reconversion
of energy to electricity is far too costly to be a justified alternative (Menanteau
et al. 2011). In our problem, we assume a market for hydrogen as an alternative
transportation fuel is in place.
Price fluctuations allow the producer to choose the best option at any given time
between selling electricity to the grid, or producing hydrogen and selling it to its
respective market. We assume energy price fluctuations in the grid to fully charac-
terize the state of the system, which includes the state of the network (capacity and
congestion) and market (balance between supply and demand) at any given time.
We set our analysis in a market where a potential hydrogen producer is re-
stricted to using renewable sources –such as wind or solar— and a grid-connected
electrolysis process for hydrogen production; i.e., purchasing energy proceeding
from alternate sources for hydrogen production is not allowed.
The main reasoning for such a setting evolves from the clean nature of hydro-
gen as an energy carrier, which would otherwise be undermined by the potential
environmental impact of using electricity generated by means of fossil feedstocks;
additionally, this matches one of the main pathways suggested for clean, emission-
free hydrogen (Wang 2002).
To enforce this restriction, a contractual mechanism would need to be put in
place to certify that energy being retrieved from the grid for hydrogen production
has been input by the firm using a renewable source. Though such mechanism is not
in place on a broad scale at the moment, we consider its implementation to be prac-
tically possible in a reasonable timeframe. We will point out that there are voluntary
programs for individual consumers willing to pay premiums for “certified” green
energy. In these privately owned programs, the utility receiving payments from
consumers will use the premium to purchase Renewable Energy Credits (RECs),
the purchase not implying that the premium will be utilized for building clean en-
1Values obtained from “Energy storage: Could hydrogen be the answer?” by Nadya Anscombe,
as appeared on http://www.solarnovus.com, on June 4, 2012.
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ergy infrastructure or cover costs from renewable generation. An overview of such
programs is available at U.S. Department of Energy (2012). Note such programs,
as well as the Compliance Markets established in the United States of America, do
not necessarily enforce that the firm holding certificates actually built renewable
infrastructure, but a modification of such programs could be a foundation for the
accountability requirements of a clean hydrogen market.
2.2 Modeling Framework
2.2.1 Network topology
Let G = (N, A) be a connected graph representing the electric transmission system
(from now on, the grid or network), where N represents the finite set of demand
nodes, with N = {1, . . . , n}. The set of edges A represents transportation paths
between pairs of demand nodes. A facility can be located anywhere in G. We later
show that, without loss of generality, the set of potential locations for facilities can
be reduced to the set of nodes N.
2.2.2 Action choices
The firm makes use of a renewable source that provides an uncertain quantity of
energy, characterized by a random variable R, with each unit of energy generated
having a cost w. The firm has knowledge of the current market price for electricity
ϕ (a realization of a random variable representing electricity price, pE). The firm
can then decide whether the actual amount of energy supplied by the source (r,
a realization of R) shall be sold to the grid at unit price ϕ or used for producing
hydrogen.
This second option requires a transformation process (electrolysis) at a facility
located at j ∈ G, which yields e units of hydrogen per unit of energy introduced,
and has a processing cost m per unit of hydrogen output. Each resulting unit of
hydrogen can then be transported to a demand node i at a cost ti j, and be sold to a
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downstream buyer at a price pH. These downstream buyers, for the purpose of our
analysis, are depots located at the ”city edge” that will then be responsible for last-
mile delivery to filling stations. This convention has been used in prior studies to
decouple the main distribution system from local logistics. A given demand point
i ∈ N requires an amount Di. The rate of hydrogen production is defined by the
capacity (C) of the electrolyzers present at a given facility, which is built a priori
by the firm at a cost Q(C) representing the amortization of the investment the firm
makes on building and operating this production capacity.
We point out that even when hydrogen is a storable good (and, precisely, its
storable nature is its main value proposition as an energy carrier), our problem does
not explicitly model the storage decision associated to the production facilities and
demand points, both of which require, by design, such storage infrastructure). The
need then arises to argue when should inventory be shifted from the production site
to the depots located at demand points. In other words, this would involve explic-
itly addressing ordering policies from downstream depots, and evaluating whether
the uncertainty in supply and storage capacity hinder in any way the transfer of hy-
drogen downstream. We do not consider this portion of the problem in this model,
as we attempt to abstract a long-term planning decision, focusing on the location
and distribution components. We can do so under the assumption of (1) the system
operating in steady state; (2) there being sufficient storage capacity at the produc-
tion site and demand points, preventing the case of production stoppages due to
storage capacity constraints; (3) there are no significant holding costs that affect
the choice of dispatch at either storage point, which is reasonable considering the
investment in storage capacity is fixed and considerably large. In the case of con-
stant hydrogen demand, which is the setting we have explored, these assumptions
can be supported.
Likewise, in the initial approach with the firm collaborating in the research
project that motivated this work, the assumption was that any safety stock nec-
essary to hedge against shortages would be held downstream at demand points,
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outside of the scope of the producing firm. Even if there were considerations for
the effect of supply uncertainty on possible inventory shortfalls or capacity con-
straints, this stochasticity would not be an issue in a long-run strategic model,
as the variability of consumption is relatively small when aggregated, given the
(daily) cyclical nature of wind generation makes it unlikely to have extended peri-
ods of non-generation. Thus, the thesis assumes the goal to be meeting demand in
expectation. Extensions to the model could attempt to capture these dynamics.
2.2.3 Timeframe for analysis
We present a static model, where we assume the system to be operating in steady
state over a long time horizon. In other words, the system has reached a point
where demand for hydrogen is considerable stable within a time period due to
some sustained level of adoption of hydrogen-powered vehicles, and the yield of
the production process is sustained. Figure 2-2 presents a general timeline with
the different phases as experienced by the producer, and the decision timeframe on
which our problem is based. The timing of the investment decision is indicated,
while operational decisions (when to produce hydrogen and/or sell electricity to
the grid) taken upon observing realization of random system elements, are taken
during the phase indicated as operating period. The timing is similar in these terms
to Aflaki and Netessine (2012).
Expected profits for the firm are calculated for an arbitrary period of analysis
(i.e., units are normalized to correspond to the length of that period) within this
long-term timeframe, the only requirement being that supply, production capacity,
and amortized facility costs are consistently defined for that same time period. Note
that market prices for electricity are usually updated, depending on the market, in
intervals ranging from five minutes to one hour; thus it would be reasonable that
the period of analysis shall be consistent with the period of price updating.
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Figure 2-2: Producer’s decision timeline
2.2.4 Pricing of goods
Hydrogen price is assumed to be constant, as in a regulated market. We consider
this a valid assumption, at least in the initial stages of the hydrogen economy, sub-
stantiated in the need to ensure sufficient and stable output and accelerate tech-
nology adoption either through subsidies or enforcement of environmental policy
(Rogner 1998).
A reasonable question is whether wind energy output is capable of affecting en-
ergy prices, and in that case, whether the supply at a given node is correlated with
energy prices at that or any other node in the grid. For this thesis we will assume
that any single renewable energy generation facility (e.g., wind farm) and hydrogen
production plant is a price-taking facility, having no considerable unilateral effect
on electricity prices or market structure (Jørgensen and Ropenus 2008, Greiner et
al. 2008), which allows us to treat. This also implies that no single generation fa-
cility can fully congest all possible paths between two nodes as this would provide
it with price-setting capability which would contradict our assumption (Barquı´n
2006). A consequence of the price-taking assumption is that electricity prices and
wind-based supply as independent (Kim and Powell 2011). We will focus on a net-
work with identical electricity price across all nodes; i.e., a single zone in a zonal
pricing scheme, which is the case in Spain.
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2.2.5 Distribution of supply
For the purpose of this thesis, we do not make any prior assumptions on the proba-
bility distribution of energy supply from the renewable source. We make, however,
a brief remark on the properties of such distribution for the benefit of the reader.
Many different factors aside from local wind speeds and patterns influence the
likelihood of a certain energy output from a wind farm. Figure 2-3 presents some
of these main factors.
Figure 2-3: Factors directly inciding in the energy output from a wind farm
In general, wind speeds at a certain location can be approximated by the use of
a two parameter Weibull distribution (generally using a shape factor of 2), which
is a widespread and well accepted practice in the wind energy research literature
(Carta et al. 2009). This input is used by firms to choose the proper turbines. An
individual turbine’s output as a function of wind speed can be described by an
output curve like that shown in Figure 2-4.
Output only fluctuates between the cut in and cut out wind speeds (the speeds
below and above which the turbine will not generate any electricity, either because
there is not sufficient input or because speeds are too high to sustain generation
causing turbine shutdown). These speeds are by design given for any specific type
of turbine. Above a certain wind speed, output approaches 100% of the rated output
value.
The probability distribution of power output from a single turbine at any given
time is obtained by using the output curve to transform the probability distribution
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Figure 2-4: Output from single turbine as function of wind speed (Source: Boyle 2004)
of wind speeds into their equivalent expected output values. The aggregated power
output for a wind farm is then obtained through aggregation of the individual out-
puts. Power values can be mapped into energy values by using an arbitrary time
interval (e.g., hours). The energy generation curve and the power output curves
will be affinely shaped. The probability distribution of power output from any
number of wind turbines, when obtained from a generic output-speed curve from
two-parameter Weibull distributed wind speeds with shape parameter 2, has a sin-
gle mode. Hence we can infer R to have a unimodal distribution.
Although this property does not play a role in our current model, it can become
relevant in extensions where structural properties are held only for specific families
of distributions, an issue we discuss briefly in §5.2.
2.2.6 Hydrogen demand
Aggregate hydrogen demand at a location for use in transportation may reason-
ably be expected to present a behavior similar to that of current automotive fuels.
Such behavior may be assumed as stable and highly predictable, conditioned on
the absence of external system disruptions that can induce unforeseeable variabil-
ity Ganslandt and Norba¨ck (2004). Extensive studies on gasoline demand indicate
it is quite inelastic in the short run (Hughes et al. 2008), although demand does
present a significant seasonal/cyclical nature (Menanteau et al. 2011).
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On the other hand, demand for fuel substitutes such as ethanol can be highly
sensitive to relative price fluctuations with respect to gasoline (i.e., in the varia-
tion of the differential between ethanol and gas prices), but we should note that
substitution is easy between these two fuels, playing a role in the higher price-
responsiveness of ethanol (Anderson 2012). Thus, a price-regulated market for
a gasoline substitute would mitigate price-elasticity issues, especially given the
specificity of vehicles when it comes to fuel use that restricts substitution. The sea-
sonality issue, however, remains unadressed in our model, and would need to be
captured in a multi-period formulation which could form the basis for future work.
Finally, we are considering the situation of a single firm generating electricity
and producing hydrogen, with no local competition in its markets of operation.
Certainly, in the case of multiple firms operating in the same markets, the problem
would take a different structure. However, it is likely that in the initial stages of
hydrogen fuel adoption, when demand is still at relatively low levels, potential
long-term risk of companies entering the market will induce the government to take
a more active role in establishing a market structure that enables firms to operate
without the added risk of competition (Bento 2008, Wang and Wang 2010).
2.2.7 Capacity cost function
We use hydrogen production capacity as a proxy for facility size, and treat storage
capacity as linked with production capacity. We assume there exists a mapping
f : C → Q between production capacity and facility costs. For a single technology
configuration (i.e., specific combination of different electrolyzers), facility costs
have two distinct components.
The first is a fixed cost that depends solely on the location of the facility, re-
gardless of its size, and may include operating permits, grid connection rights, land
acquisition, and site overhead expenses.
The second component is a variable cost, which depends on production capacity
and may include operation and maintenance of electrolyzers, liquefiers, storage
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facilities and flow systems. Variable costs are affected by the system’s scale and are
assumed to be convex increasing in capacity, an assumption based on the behavior
of some manufacturing systems when subjected to increasing utilization rates.
We should point out that at the current state of technology, electrolyzer size
is such that, for utility-level deployment of hydrogen infrastructure, increases in
capacity would likely be achieved by the addition of (relatively small) electrolyzer
units. This would be approximated in a large-scale planning model as a linear
function. The inclusion of an alternative with economies of scale is feasible in
the current model, as the solution methodology proposed in the case of the market
selection policy is unaffected by the shape of the capacity cost function. Since (as
will be presented in §3) this procedure can be suitably adapted for the proportional
allocation case, then both problems can be solved numerically independently of the
shape of Q(C).
The capacity decision is made at time zero by the producer and we assume it
cannot be reversed; in fact, it could be done at considerable cost, but we will not
consider this possibility. Table 2.1 summarizes the parameters used throughout this
thesis, while Figure 2-5 illustrates the association of the model parameters with the
components of the wind-hydrogen system.
2.3 The Producer’s Problem
Based on the hydrogen price set by the regulator, the producer faces the problem
of choosing the locations for the electrolysis plants, how much capacity to build at
each site, and deciding which markets to serve from each plant.
Let ρi = Di∑
k∈N Dk
be the proportion of demand corresponding to node i ∈ N,
S k ⊆ N a (fixed) subset of demand nodes in the network served by a single facility,
and ρS k =
∑
i∈S k ρi the proportion of demand corresponding to subset S k. Then,
t¯ j|S k =
∑
i∈S k ρiti j
ρS k
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R Supply of renewable energy (kWh). Generally distributed random vari-
able, with density fR(·) and full support over [0,Rmax], where Rmax ∈ R
represents maximum generation capacity at the source.
Di Demand rate for hydrogen at node i in kilograms.
pE Price of electricity ($/kWh). Generally distributed random variable with
density function fpE (·).
pH Wholesale price of hydrogen at demand node i ($/kg). Deterministic.
w Unit variable cost of electricity generation at source ($/kWh). Deter-
ministic.
e Hydrogen production efficiency, as units of hydrogen output per unit of
energy input (kg/kWh). Deterministic.
m Unit variable cost of hydrogen production ($/kg). Deterministic, and the
same for all potential locations.
ti j Unit variable cost of hydrogen transport to demand site i from location
j ($/kg). Assumed constant, thus treating transportation costs as linear
in flow.
Q(·) Amortized facility costs ($). Assumed the same for all locations.
Table 2.1: Summary of model parameters.
Figure 2-5: Illustration of problem setting, including model parameters.
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is the weighted average transportation cost per unit of hydrogen from location j ∈
S k to such a subset of demand nodes.
Effectively, every unit of hydrogen produced at and distributed from location
j to some portion of the network will translate into a constant transportation cost
t¯ j|S k ; thus, any subset of demand nodes S k ⊆ N being supplied from a single facility
at j can be treated as a single entity, with demand DS k =
∑
i∈S k Di and associated
transportation cost t¯ j|S k . For the remainder of this section, we slightly abuse nota-
tion by using t¯ j for expressing such transportation cost for a facility at j, whenever
the target subset S k is implied as fixed. Given the allocation decision is done at
an earlier time than operational decisions (i.e., decisions associated to individual
realizations of the random variables), then such a notational choice does not have
any effect on the understanding of the problem.
At any given time, the producer compares the profit rate of selling a kilowatt-
hour (kWh) of electricity from the source to the grid (piE), with that of using a kWh
of electricity to produce and deliver hydrogen from a location j (piHj ). We define:
piE = ϕ − w
piHj (t¯ j) = e(p
H − m) − w − t¯ j
For adequate comparison, piE and piHj (t¯ j) are in equivalent units ($/kWh). Clearly, if
piE ≥ piHj (t¯ j) then it is more profitable for the producer to sell electricity to the grid
than producing hydrogen at location j ∈ G.
The relation of the profit rates with the zero profit benchmark yields six sce-
narios, of which only those where piHj ≥ 0 will be feasible for firms operating in
this setting (see Figure 2-6), given the condition that hydrogen production using
the firm’s own electricity generation must be profitable in order to justify any elec-
trolysis capacity investment.
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Figure 2-6: Feasible profitability scenarios for the producer.
2.3.1 Analysis of profitability scenarios
We proceed to analyze each scenario separately, leading to the aggregated (ex-
pected) profit function for the producer. Within this section we look only at a par-
ticular action choice given a pair of realizations of energy prices and supply, when
production is done at a particular facility j. An implicit assumption here is that the
firm acts rationally while facing each market situation, meaning no external factor
(e.g., a competing firm, a conflicting strategic objective) is present that will cause
the firm to deviate from that particular action.
We introduce the following notation to be used throughout. Let X be a generally
distributed random variable with continuous and differentiable probability density
function fX(x). Let a, b ∈ DX, and the following functions be defined:
FX(a) =
∫ a
−∞
fX(x)dx
FcX(a) = 1 − FX(a) =
∫ ∞
a
fX(x)dx
GX(a) ≡
∫ a
−∞
x fX(x)dx
HX(a, b) ≡ FX(b) − FX(a).
Note GX(a) is nondecreasing in a and converges to E[X] as a → ∞. Also, R¯ and
p¯E will represent the expected value of energy supply and prices, respectively. We
also define β j(t¯ j) = pH − m − we − t¯ j as the marginal profit per kg of hydrogen
produced at location j and delivered, and Π¯k as the contribution to expected profits
from scenario k = {1, 2, 3}.
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Scenario 1: piH ≥ 0 > piE
In this scenario, hydrogen production is the only profitable alternative for the
firm, hence it will produce as much hydrogen as plant capacity or electricity supply
allows. In the case electricity supply exceeds hydrogen plant capacity, the firm has
no alternative profitable use for the excess electricity resulting, in the absence of
alternative storage mechanisms, in a loss of the potential supply. The profitability
conditions lead to the following:
piE < 0 ⇒ ϕ < w
piH > piE ⇒ ϕ < e(pH − m − t¯ j)
Notice the first expression imposes a stronger condition than the second on elec-
tricity price. Hence pE < w sets the general bound on electricity prices for this
scenario. We denote the case where the firm chooses to only produce hydrogen as
Case 1. The amount of hydrogen to be produced by the firm will be min{er,C}.
Then, the contribution to total expected profits from this case is:
Π¯1 = β j(t¯ j)ER[min{eR,C j}
∫ w
−∞
fpE (y)dy]
= β j(t¯ j)FpE (w)
[
C jFcR(C j/e) + e GR(C j/e)
]
(2.1)
Scenario 2: piE ≥ piH ≥ 0
Here, generating electricity and selling it to the grid is more profitable than hy-
drogen production. Hence, when facing this scenario and in the absence of external
constraints enforcing some minimum production requirement, the firm will resort
only to the former activity. From the profitability conditions we have:
piE ≥ 0 ⇒ ϕ ≥ w
piE ≥ piH ≥ 0 ⇒ ϕ ≥ e(pH − m − t¯ j)
As piH ≥ 0, then e(pH − m − t¯ j) ≥ w and ϕ ≥ e(pH − m − t¯ j) becomes the tighter
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price condition . For convenience, define δ j(t¯ j) = e(pH − m − t¯ j). We denote the
occurrence of this scenario as Case 2, and estimate its contribution to expected
profits as:
Π¯2 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
δ j(t¯ j)
x (y − w) fpE (y) fR(x)dy dx
= R¯
(
p¯E − w
)
− R¯
(
GpE (δ j(t¯ j)) − wFpE (δ j(t¯ j))
)
(2.2)
Scenario 3: piH > piE ≥ 0
With hydrogen production the most profitable alternative, the firm will focus
on that activity first, as long as capacity allows and there is sufficient energy supply
available. However, if supply exceeds the equivalent production capacity, excess
electricity can be sold to the grid, as it is also profitable to do so. From the prof-
itability conditions we have ϕ ≥ w and ϕ < e(pH − m − t¯ j) = δ j(t¯ j). Thus, this
scenario is defined for the nodal prices in the interval w ≤ ϕ < δ j(t¯ j).
The sale of excess electricity to the grid is subject to the additional condition
r ≥ C j/e. We denote this instance as Case 3a, while the instance where r < C j/e is
denoted as Case 3b. We can then estimate the contribution to total expected profits
derived from the occurrence of this scenario as follows:
Π¯3 = β j(t¯ j)ER[min{eR,C j}
∫ δ j(t¯ j)
w
fpE (y)dy]
+
∫ ∞
C j/e
∫ δ j(t¯ j)
w
(
x −C j/e
)
(y − w) fpE (y) fR(x)dy dx
= β j(t¯ j)HpE (w, δ j(t¯ j))
(
C jFcR(C j/e) + e GR(C j/e)
)
(2.3)
+
(
w
e
HpE (w, δ j(t¯ j)) − 1e
(
GpE (δ j(t¯ j)) −GpE (w)
))
·
(
C jFcR(C j/e) + eGR(C j/e) − eR¯
)
We can see these scenarios create a set of mutually exclusive intervals for pE
and R (Figure 2-7) such that for any realization of these random parameters there
is a best course of action by the producer, given its selected production capacity C j
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Figure 2-7: Energy price and supply conditions.
(Table 2.2). Here, δ j(t¯ j) represents then the minimum electricity price at which the
producer prefers selling energy to the grid rather than produce hydrogen at location
j and deliver it to its assigned markets.
2.3.2 The producer’s expected profit function
By combining expressions (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), we can obtain the firm’s total ex-
pected profits. In the absence of hydrogen production capacity, the firm’s expected
profits from electricity generation can be estimated as
KE = R¯
(
p¯E − w
)
+ R¯wFpE (w) − R¯GpE (w).
We define Πˆ j = Π¯1 +Π¯2 +Π¯3−KE as the expected additional profits from hydrogen
production (derived from the cases in Figure 2-7) for a firm operating a facility at
location j ∈ G beyond the base profits from electricity generation. In other words,
Πˆ j represents the contribution of hydrogen to firm profits. We then have:
Πˆ j = KHj (t¯ j)C jF
c
R(C j/e) + eK
H
j (t¯ j)GR(C j/e) − Q(C j) (2.4)
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where:
KH(t¯ j) = β j(t¯ j)FpE (δ j(t¯ j)) − 1e
(
GpE (δ j(t¯ j)) −GpE (w) − wHpE (w, δ j(t¯ j))
)
.
Here, KHj (t¯ j) represents the marginal gains from hydrogen production and de-
livery; its first term capturing the profits derived from this activity when it is the
most profitable choice (pE < δ j(t¯ j)), and the second term representing the profits
from selling electricity surrendered by the firm in order to produce hydrogen, when
both options are profitable but hydrogen production is preferred (w ≤ pE < δ j(t¯ j)).
In general, for the market selection case, KHj (t¯ j) will be nonnegative, as the pro-
ducer will not select a subset with negative marginal hydrogen profits; the same,
however, can’t be said of the proportional allocation case where the producer might
be induced to serve subsets with negative marginal hydrogen contribution in its so-
lution.
By considering only the additional profits attainable from hydrogen production,
we can focus our capacity optimization problem on the interval of potential positive
capacity values (0, eRmax], and disregard the discontinuity caused by fixed costs at
C j = 0. Intuitively, the decision for building a given capacity C∗j > 0 will rely on
determining whether Πˆ j(C∗j) ≥ 0.
First and second order differentiation for (2.4) with respect to production ca-
pacity yield:
dΠˆ j
dC j
= KHj (t¯ j)F
c
R(C j/e) − Q′(C j) (2.5)
d2Πˆ j
dC2j
= −K
H
j (t¯ j)
e
fR(C j/e) − Q′′(C j) (2.6)
Thus, we can establish the following result regarding the producer’s profit func-
tion.
Proposition 1. The total expected profit function for the producer (Πˆ j) associated
to a facility located at j serving a fixed subset of nodes is concave when capacity
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costs are convex.
Proof. Follows from expression (2.6), as KHj (t¯ j) ≥ 0, and Q′′(C j) ≥ 0 for convex
capacity costs. 
The following sections will focus on the producer’s problem when subject to
the alternative distribution policies.
We now address the problem of locating one and multiple facilities in the net-
work when the producer can choose the markets which it will serve. For clarity,
we can use (2.4) to define the output associated to a production capacity C j, given
production always occurs when supply is available, as H¯ j(C j) = C jFcR(C j/e) +
eGR(C j/e).
However, no production would occur when the price of electricity is higher
than the threshold δy(t¯y|S y). To account for those instances where electricity prices
may induce no production even when supply is available (Scenario 2), we adjust
the output as follows:
Hˆy(Cy, t¯y|S y) = [CyF
c
R(Cy/e) + eGR(Cy/e)]FpE (δy(t¯y|S y))
2.4 Locating a Single Facility on the Network
The problem of locating a single facility in a network under a market selection
policy is defined as follows. Let S y ⊆ N represent the set of demand nodes to
be served from a production facility located at y ∈ G, and DS y =
∑
i∈S y Di the
aggregated hydrogen demand for such node subset, and t¯y|S y the associated unit
transportation cost of from the facility to its chosen demand nodes.
ZMS (y, S y,Cy) = Max
y∈G,S y⊆N,Cy≥0
KHy (t¯y|S y)H¯y(Cy) − Q(Cy)
s.t. H¯y(Cy)FpE (δy(t¯y|S y)) = DS y
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Note the following properties of total expected (hydrogen) output H¯y(Cy):
dH¯y(Cy)
dCy
= FcR(Cy/e) ≥ 0
d2H¯y(Cy)
dC2y
= −1
e
fR(Cy/e) < 0
H¯y(Cy)→ eR¯ as Cy → eRmax.
As the distribution of energy supply has full support over [0, eRmax], H¯y(Cy) will
be concave increasing on capacity for that same range of capacity values, provided
that production always occurs when supply is available. The same holds for Hˆy(Cy)
when the threshold δ· is fixed; i.e., when a pair (y, S y) is chosen. Thus, for DS y ≤
eR¯ and a fixed pair (y, S y), there exists a one-to-one mapping between capacity
and output (both general output H¯y(·) and adjusted output Hˆy(·), and Cy can be
obtained from numerically solving Hˆy(Cy) = DS y . We will denote this solution as
C∗y(DS y , t¯y|S y), which makes capacity costs directly dependent on the selected subset
S y, where C∗y(DS y , t¯y|S y) is convex increasing in subset demand. This also sets a
natural upper bound on market size DS y , as no production can be achieved beyond
eR¯. We can rewrite the producer’s profit function as follows.
(SFMS) ZMS (y, S y) = Max
y∈G,S y⊆N
DS y
KHy (t¯y|S y)
FpE (δy(t¯y|S y))
− Q
(
C∗y(DS y , t¯y|S y)
)
(2.7)
The following property holds for the producer’s profit function.
Proposition 2. Given a fixed location j and demand subset S j, ZMS ( j, S j) is de-
creasing in t¯ j|S j if K
H
j (t¯ j|S j) <
FpE
(
δ j(t¯ j|S j )
)2
fpE
(
δ j(t¯ j|S j )
) .
Proof. For a given location j and allocation subset S j we have expected profits:
DS j
KHj (t¯ j|S j)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
− Q
(
C∗j(DS j , t¯ j|S j)
)
The threshold value δ j(·) is decreasing in t¯ j|S j , so the proportion of time that
supply is available and the producer finds itself in the hydrogen production region
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(scenarios 1, 3a and 3b in Figure 2-7) gets smaller. This means the producer re-
quires greater capacity to achieve the same level of output to meet demand. Thus,
C∗j(DS j , t¯ j|S j) is increasing in t¯ j|S j . Since Q(C
∗
j(·, ·)) is increasing in C∗j(·, ·), then
∂Q(C∗j (·,t¯ j|S j ))
∂t¯ j|S j
> 0 From the revenue term we obtain:
∂
∂t¯ j|S j
KHj (t¯ j|S j)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
=
fpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))K
H
j (t¯ j|S j)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))2
− 1
It is then assured ZMS (·, t¯ j|S j) is decreasing in t¯ j|S j if KHj (t¯ j|S j) <
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j ))
2
fpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j ))
. 
Note the condition described in Proposition 2 is sufficient, but not necessary.
Likewise, we can evaluate the second order conditions:
∂2ZMS ( j, S j)
∂t¯2j|S j
=
f ′pE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))K
H
j (t¯ j|S j)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))2
− fpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
− 2 fp
E (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
2KHj (t¯ j|S j)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))3
+
∂2Q(C∗j(·, t¯ j|S j))
∂t¯2j|S j
As can be observed, convexity can’t be assured for general distributions and sets
of parameters. However, it can be verified for particular instances of the problem.
Proposition 2, assuming the conditions for preserving monotonicity are met,
implies that for two subsets S 1, S 2 of equal size, the subset with lowest weighted
transportation cost will be preferred for yielding higher profits. Because the total
size of the market to be served affects expected profits, this preference relationship
does not immediately extend to comparing differently sized subsets. However, we
can derive a structural property of the (SFMS) that will enable the derivation of
solution procedures.
For simplicity, we will incur in some slight abuse of terminology and refer to a
node with lower (higher) transportation cost as being closer (farther) to a location
j. Thus, j(i) represents the ith unserved demand node closest to j. For a fixed
facility at j, we can define {S j(1) , . . . , S j(n)} as the series of subsets formed from the
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consecutive addition of nodes j(1), . . . , j(n) (i.e., S j(i) = S j(i−1)
⋃{ j(i)}). Recall that the
market selection policy requires the nodes selected to be fully served; however, we
establish some properties that are relevant for the case where partial fulfillment of a
node’s demand is allowed, and then adjust this result to incorporate the integrality
constraint. In order to capture partial fulfillment we can use variables xi j ∈ [0, 1] to
define the portion of demand of node i that is served from a facility j (with x∗j the
optimal such vector for a facility j). Note that for the remainder of this section we
will assume the monotonicity condition described in Proposition 2 is met.
Lemma 1. Given two nodes a, b ∈ N not fully served by j (xa j, xb j < 1), where
ta j < tb j, then the producer obtains greater total expected profits from serving a
unit of demand of node a rather than serving a unit of demand of node b.
Proof. Let j be the potential location for a facility, and a and b represent the two
currently unserved nodes with lowest transportation cost from j, with ta j < tb j.
From the definition of t¯ j|S j , we can rewrite the weighted transportation cost of a
unit of hydrogen from j to its subset S j as
t¯ j|S j = t¯ j|S 0 +
Di
Di + DS 0
(ti j − t¯ j|S 0)
where S 0 = S j \ {i} is the subset served prior to the inclusion of a node i. Assume
Di ∈ Q, thus allowing to split any node i into a finite number of nodes of size  > 0
located at the original distance ti j. Let a and b denote the -sized nodes derived
from a and b, respectively. From (2.7) we can derive the producer’s expected profits
for a fixed facility located at j:
ZMSj ( j, S j) = MaxS j⊆N
DS j
KHj (t¯ j|S j)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
− Q
(
C∗j(DS j , t¯ j|S j)
)
Then, if a node of size  with transportation cost ti j is included in S j, the result-
ing expected profits are given by the above expression, with parameters t¯ j|S j ←
t¯ j|S 0 +

DS 0 +
(ti j− t¯ j|S 0) and DS j ← DS 0 +. The producer will be indifferent in choos-
37
ing between any two nodes a , as their equal size and transportation cost yields the
same expected profits when included in S j. Likewise, it will be indifferent between
any two nodes b . Thus, the only remaining marginal comparison required for es-
tablishing the optimal addition of a node to S j will involve comparing the expected
profits of adding either a node a or a node b . Given both are of equal size, the
only differentiating components of the profit function are those factors involving
transportation costs, namely KHj (t¯ j|S j)/FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j)). For clarifying notation, we’ll
define ψ j
(
t¯ j|S j
)
≡ K
H
j
(
t¯ j|S j
)
FpE
(
δy(t¯ j|S j )
) .
Let S a = S 0
⋃{a} and S b = S 0 ⋃{b}. As ta < tb then t¯ j|S a < t j|S b . By
Proposition 2 we have ψ j
(
t¯ j|S a
)
=
KHj (t¯ j|S a)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S a ))
>
KHj (t¯ j|S b)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S b ))
= ψ j
(
t¯ j|S b
)
; thus, the
addition of a node a to any current subset S 0 provides greater profits than the
addition of a node b . This property holds for any fixed initial subset S 0, including
S 0 = {∅}. Thus, the first node to be assigned to a facility located at j will be a node
a .
For the second inclusion, the subset S 0 is updated to S 0
⋃{a} = {a}, with
associated transportation cost t¯ j|S 0 = ta j ≥ 0 and demand DS 0 =  ≥ 0. Thus,
by extension of the previous condition, as long as there is a node a available for
inclusion, no node b will be included in S j, so the entirety of node a will be served
before any portion of node b is served. Note that each subsequent inclusion of the
node with smallest transportation cost available will result in equal or greater value
for t¯ j|S j (i.e., the weighted transportation cost will be non-decreasing), and ti j ≥ t j|S 0
as t¯ j|S 0 results from a weighted average of a set of transportation costs less than or
equal to ti j, thus ψ j(t¯ j|S j) will be non-increasing.
Finally, once addition of all nodes a has been completed, the tradeoff moves to
comparing nodes b with the corresponding nodes of size  formed from splitting
the next closest unassigned node (e.g., c). As tc j > tb j, then node b will be included
in its entirety before including any portion of node c, yielding the generalized result
that the addition of any portion of a node with lower transportation cost still not in
a subset is locally optimal given a facility located at j, completing the proof. 
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This enables us to establish the following results for the producer’s profit func-
tion for a fixed location j ∈ G.
Theorem 1. There exists a node j(k) for which the following conditions are satisfied.
(1) ZMS ( j, S j(i)) < Z
MS ( j, S j(i+1)), for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1, and ZMS ( j, S j(i)) >
ZMS ( j, S j(i+1)), for all i = k, . . . , n − 1.
(2) x∗j contains at most one non-integer element. Thus, an optimal subset con-
tains at most one partially served node j(i∗), which will either be j(k) or j(k+1).
(3) x∗j(k) j = 1,∀k < i∗, and x∗j(k) j = 0,∀k > i∗.
Proof. (1) Because of Lemma 1, for any current solution x j ∈ [0, 1]n only one node
i with xi j < 1 (the nearest) is considered for inclusion. All other components of x j
being fixed, weighted transportation costs are increasing in xi j. Consequently, each
marginal increase of xi j results in a gradually smaller decrease of KHj (·); in other
words, KHj (·) will be decreasing with respect to xi j.
The expression ZMS ( j, S j(k)) considers the full addition of node j(k) to the sub-
set served by location j; i.e., x j(k) j = 1. Assume a node j(k) is found for which
ZMS ( j, S j(k)) < Z
MS ( j, S j(k−1)) and Z
MS ( j, S j(k)) > Z
MS ( j, S j(k+1)). For the first in-
equality we require marginal profits to be strictly positive. As the subsequent addi-
tion of full nodes necessarily increases weighted transportation costs and decreases
marginal contribution KH(·), while it increases capacity costs Q(·), then any full
node j(i) included prior to j(k) must have resulted in greater profits than those de-
rived from the previous inclusion j(i), explaining the increasing sequence of total
profits for j(i) : i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Likewise, if total profits are reduced with the
complete addition of j(k+1), then the addition of the node with next highest trans-
portation cost j(k+2) will result in lower total profits. As weighted transportation
costs are increasing, any further addition of a node will decrease profits below
those of the previous inclusion, explaining the increasing sequence of total profits
for j(i) : i = k, . . . , n − 1.
(2) For the first part of the proof, assume 0 < xi j < 1 for some demand node
i and facility located at j. A direct result from Lemma 1 is that for any portion of
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node i to be the optimal choice for inclusion in the demand served by j, we require
that no closer node has any unserved demand, thus {l : xl j < 1, tl j < ti j} = ∅ and
xl j = 1,∀ l : tl j < ti j. By extension of the same property, for any node l farther
than i to have xl j > 0, this would require xi j = 1, which would contradict our
initial assumption. Thus, xl j = 0,∀l : tl j > ti j, and only one element of x∗j can be
non-integer.
For the second part of the proof, note that j(k) is the last node that increases total
expected profits when included in its entirety. As each new node included in the
service subset has greater or equal transportation costs than the previous included
node (and, consequently, than the current weighted average cost) we have that t¯ j|·
will increase at a steeper rate when the first portion of a new node is included. This
means that when the inclusion of node j(k) is completed, if the marginal expected
profits Πˆ′j(·) are positive, then total expected profits either reach a maximum at
x j(k) j = 1 or at some partial allocation of node j(k+1) (i.e., 0 < x j(k+1) j < 1). Likewise,
if marginal expected profits at that point are negative, it must be because total
expected profits reach a maximum for some partial allocation of node j(k) (i.e.,
0 < x j(k) < 1).
(3) Follows from the proof of part (2). 
Given this result, we can derive a procedure for the formation of service subsets
for each candidate location when nodes are not required to be served in their en-
tirety. Since there are infinite potential sites, we first establish the node optimality
property (Hakimi 1964) to reduce the set of viable locations. Let y∗ be the optimal
location of a facility serving a node subset S ⊆ N, while G[S ] is the graph induced
by node subset S . Then,
Proposition 3. For a service subset S ⊆ N assigned to some facility under a market
selection policy, y j = argmini∈G[S ]{t¯i|S j}.
Proof. The proof is a result of Proposition 2, resulting in the lowest weighted trans-
portation cost location being optimal for a fixed subset. 
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Note that the expression in Proposition 3 is equivalent to determining the 1-
median solution to the problem given a subset of nodes to be served. When partial
inclusion of nodes is allowed, this property will still hold as any portion of a node
can be treated as a node in itself. As Hakimi (1964) established the existence
of a nodal solution to the p-median problem (of which the 1-median is a special
case), we are guaranteed there exists a location y∗ ∈ N for which ZMS (y∗, S ) ≥
ZMS ( j, S ), ∀ j ∈ G[S ].
Theorem 1 suggests that the linear relaxation of the (SFMS) can be solved by
fixing a facility at a given node, sorting the remaining nodes in increasing order
of transportation cost, and continuously adding the nearest node until the profit
function reaches a maximum which, given the function’s unimodality, will be a
global optimum (this procedure would be repeated for all n nodes). Thus, this
linear relaxation is analogous to a continuous knapsack problem.
The nonlinear integer problem shown in expression (2.7) is, however, NP-hard.
To support this claim, we can refer to the definition of the 0-1 knapsack problem
(Martello and Toth 1990), with each node i included having a weight Di and a value
vi, and the knapsack having a capacity eR¯. Since vi is a function of the other nodes
in a particular feasible solution, the number of evaluations to guarantee optimality
is in the order of 2n, with a complexity akin to that of a 0-1 knapsack problem,
which is NP-complete.
This complexity does not pose an obstacle for small size instances where enu-
meration is a reasonable alternative; however, larger problems could not reasonably
be solved through enumeration. We propose some efficient alternative procedures
to address this issue, which will be used for the case when multiple facilities are to
be located (i.e., p > 1).
2.4.1 Numerical methods
We present two base procedures –nearest-node and greedy inclusion— for obtain-
ing a reasonably good approximation to the optimal service subset for a fixed node.
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Given the result presented in Theorem 1 we can expect the nearest-node result to
be close to optimality, especially in low-density networks where the difference in
added profits from inclusion will be more significant across alternatives (the same
effect will also be perceived in the use of the greedy heuristic).
After introducing the two based heuristics, we will also present an extension for
exploring improved solutions, which is especially relevant in networks of greater
density where the base heuristics may converge to a point significantly far from the
true optimal solution. Such an enhancement is based on neighborhood search, and
it can be applied to either of the base heuristics.
Nearest-node inclusion heuristic:
Step 0 (Initialization): S 0j = {∅}, z0j = 0,∀ j = 1, . . . , n. Set j = 1, k = 1.
Step 1 (Node ordering): Sort nodes in ascending order based on transportation
cost from node j (ti j); denote the kth lowest-cost node as j(k).
Step 2 (Node inclusion): S kj = S
k
j
⋃{ j(k)}, zkj = ZMS ( j, S kj). If zkj < zk−1j or k = n
then proceed to Step 3; else k ← k + 1, repeat Step 2.
Step 3 (Local termination): z∗j = maxk{zkj}, S ∗j =
{
S kj : k = argmaxk{zkj}
}
. If
j = n then proceed to Step 4; else j← j + 1, go to Step 1.
Step 4 (SFMS solution): Optimal location y∗ = argmax j∈N{z∗j}, S ∗ = S ∗y. 
Greedy inclusion heuristic:
Step 0 (Initialization): S 0j = {∅}, z0j = 0,∀ j = 1, . . . , n. Set j = 1.
Step 1 (Facility fixing): S 1j = { j}, z1j = ZMS ( j, { j}). If z1j < 0 then proceed to
Step 3, otherwise I ← N \ { j}, k = 2.
Step 2 (Node inclusion): While k ≤ n, find i+= argmaxi∈I{ZMS ( j, S k−1j
⋃{i})},
S kj = S
k−1
j
⋃{i+} and zkj = ZMS ( j, S kj); update k ← k + 1 and I ← I \ {i+}.
Step 3 (Local termination): z∗j = maxk{zkj}, S ∗j =
{
S kj : k = argmaxk{zkj}
}
. If
j ≤ n then proceed to Step 4; else j← j + 1, go to Step 1.
Step 4 (SFMS solution): Optimal location y∗ = argmax j∈N{z∗j}, S ∗ = S ∗y∗ . 
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Due to the effect of transportation costs on marginal profits from hydrogen produc-
tion, both heuristics will bear strong resemblance in the construction of solutions
for a fixed facility. We can present an enhancement to the nearest-node (alterna-
tively, greedy) heuristic to exploit potential improvements in the neighborhood of
the resulting subset.
The algorithm creates a base subset using a feasible solution, such as that ob-
tained by either base heuristic, and explores its neighborhood for an improving
direction represented by a node removal, addition, or exchange. At each cycle,
the base subset is updated from selecting the neighborhood subset with the highest
profits (i.e., in a greedy manner).
Note that this procedure does not guarantee an optimal solution as: (1) only one
of (possibly) many increasing paths is chosen at each iteration, and (2) it does not
consider the possibility that there is no single-node operation that increases profits
but that there are two-node operations that achieve this (we refer the reader to §2.6,
where this particular situation arises). However, it does provide a stronger approx-
imation to the optimal subset for a fixed facility without significantly increasing
computational cost.
Hybrid heuristic:
Step 0 (Initialization): Set j = 1, t = 1.
Step 1 (Base subset): Use nearest-node (or greedy) inclusion heuristic for facil-
ity node j; assign solution as base subset B j, z0j = Z
MS ( j, B j).
Step 2 (Neighborhood search): Define the neighborhood N j of B j as the fol-
lowing sets:
• B j \ {i},∀i ∈ B j,
• B j ⋃{k},∀k < B j, and
• B j \ {i}⋃{k},∀{i, k} s.t. i ∈ B j, k < B j
43
For each subset in N j, calculate ZMS ( j, ·), choose set with highest profits S tj as the
t-degree neighborhood-optimal solution, with profits ztj.
Step 3 (Validation): If ztj > z
t−1
j , then B j ← S tj, t ← t + 1, repeat Step 2;
otherwise, B j is nodal solution with profits z∗j = z
t−1
j . If z
∗
j < 0, then S
∗
j = {∅} (i.e.,
j is not a feasible location). If j = n then proceed to Step 4; else update j ← j + 1
and return to Step 1.
Step 4 (SFMS solution): Optimal location y∗ = argmax j∈N{z∗j}, S ∗ = S ∗y∗ . 
The nearest-node and greedy inclusion heuristics require a number of operations
in the order of O(n2logn) and O(n3), respectively, for selecting a single location
from n nodes.
The hybrid algorithm presented here builds on the result of the nearest-node
inclusion procedure, with the main driver of complexity being the formation of the
neighborhood sets (O(n2)) and the possible number of cycles before an improv-
ing direction is not found. At each cycle, the cardinality of the set increases or
decreases by one unit, or stays unchanged. The number of node additions and sub-
stractions within a cycle is then bounded by O(n), while the maximum number of
swaps is bounded by O(n2). Since only a single increasing path (if any) is followed
at each iteration and no backtracking is allowed, we are assured the procedure will
terminate.
We will point out that the hybrid algorithm can use any feasible solution as a
starting point; thus, it can be adapted to build on the result of the greedy algorithm
if necessary (as will be explained later, this is the case for the branch-and-price
procedure used in the multiple facility problem).
Although theoretical worst case performance of the hybrid procedure is signif-
icantly inferior to that of the two base heuristics, actual average performance will
be considerably better than this upper bound given the relative closeness of the
nearest-node solution to the optimal integer allocation, which limits the number of
exchanges before converging to a (local) optimum.
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In §2.6 we present some numerical results for the three heuristics in order to
compare their computational performance. We point out that in all but one of the
instances which could be verified by enumeration the hybrid heuristic found the
optimal service subset for a fixed facility node.
2.5 Locating Multiple Facilities on the Network
We now address the problem of locating an arbitrary number of facilities under a
market selection distribution policy. The general formulation is as follows.
(MFMS) ZMS (y,S) = Max
S,y∈G
|S|∑
j=1
Πˆy j(y j, S j)
s.t.
⋃
j
S j ⊆ N; S i
⋂
S j = {∅},∀i , j
y j ∈ S j, ∀ j
For the special case of an exogenously-defined number of facilities (p), the cardi-
nality condition |S| = p would need to be incorporated to the formulation. How-
ever, our suggested solution method does not require this condition. Note that the
constraint set of the original formulation defines a feasible node packing, thus the
(MFMS) optimization problem is NP-complete. We can use this structure to derive
an exact procedure for the (MFMS) problem based on column generation (Dantzig
and Wolfe 1960).
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2.5.1 Exact method: Branch-and-price
The column generation form of this problem is equivalent to that of a set packing
problem, with the master problem defined as follows:
(CGMS) Max
λ
∑
k
zkλk
s.t.
∑
k
θikλk ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
λk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k ∈ ω
where ω is a group of subsets of N, and zk represents the net profits derived from
grouping a subset of demand nodes (S k) to be served from a single facility, which
will be located at yk (as per Proposition 3), with zk = ZMS (yk, S k). Also, θik = 1 if
i ∈ S k and zero otherwise.
Recall ψ j
(
t¯ j|S j
)
≡ K
H
j
(
t¯ j|S j
)
FpE
(
δy(t¯ j|S j )
) . For a given potential location j ∈ N we have the
following pricing subproblem:
Max
S j
DS j
KHj (t¯ j|S j)
FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
− Q(C∗j(DS j)) +
∑
i∈S j
µi (2.8)
or, equivalently,
Max
x
∑
i∈N
(
Diψ j(x) − µi
)
xi j − Q(x)
s.t. xi j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
where µi ≤ 0 is the dual variable associated to the ith convexity constraint from the
master problem. Also, xi j = 1 if i ∈ S j, thus weighted average transportation costs
can be defined as t¯ j|S j =
∑
i∈N Diti j xi j∑
i∈N Di xi j
. If all subsets resulting from the solution of the
n pricing subproblems yield negative increased profits then we have obtained an
optimal solution to (MFMS).
The pricing problem has the same complexity of a fixed-node iteration (i.e.,
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Steps 0–3) of the (SFMS) problem. It is known that the existence of a polynomial
time exact algorithm for the pricing subproblem would make the restricted master
problem solvable in polynomial time (Lu¨bbecke and Desrosiers 2005). However,
we established in §2.4 that this was not the case. We can overcome this issue by
using an approximation algorithm for the pricing problem. We refer the reader
to Barnhart et al. (1998) for a discussion on that matter. As the hybrid heuristic
introduced in §2.4.1 achieves a good practical bound with respect to optimal so-
lutions (see §2.6) it will closely match the column generation pattern that would
be obtained from an optimal solution to each pricing problem, while saving sig-
nificant computation time. If no new entering columns are found through the set
of approximated pricing problem solutions, an exact procedure will be required to
verify optimality. A branch-and-bound algorithm is suitable for this purpose.
We need to adapt the hybrid heuristic to address the pricing problem through
the following changes: use the greedy heuristic solution for defining the base subset
B j, and use (2.8) as the value function. The rationale for basing the algorithm on
the greedy solution (rather than the more efficient nearest-node heuristic) is that,
when incorporating the dual variables to the problem, the unimodal behavior of the
nearest-node policy described in Theorem 1 will not hold in general (save for very
particular instances). The adapted greedy heuristic is structurally unaffected by the
inclusion of the dual variables, and will approach more rapidly the optimal subset
with little added computational cost.
We can now define an exact procedure based on the branch-and-price method
described in Barnhart et al. (1998) to solve the multiple facility problem, as follows.
Branch-and-price algorithm for (MFMS):
Step 0 (Initialization): Define initial set of n + 1 columns ω as all singleton sets
and N.
Step 1 (Relocation): For each column k ∈ ω, locate facility at the 1-median
solution, i.e., yk = argmini∈S k{t¯i|S k}; calculate zk = DS jψ j(t¯t|S j) − Q(C∗j(DS j)).
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Step 2 (Relaxed problem): Solve linear relaxation of problem (CGMS) for col-
umn set ω.
Step 3 (Insertion): Based on dual variables µi ≤ 0, solve the pricing subprob-
lem for each designated base node j. Resulting nonempty solutions from pricing
subproblems are added to set ω, return to Step 1. If no new columns are formed
with positive increased profits, then proceed to Step 4.
Step 4 (Optimality validation): Execute exact algorithm for pricing subproblem
for each designated base node j. If no new columns exist with positive increased
profits, then proceed to Step 5, otherwise add new columns to ω, return to Step 1.
Step 5 (Branching): If λk ∈ {0, 1},∀k ∈ ω then λ is optimal solution to (MFMS)
and Stop; else choose one element λk ∈ (0, 1) for branching, repeat Step 1. 
A clarification shall be made regarding Step 0 in this algorithm. Given that the
market selection policy allows for demand nodes to remain observed, any initial
subset of columns will produce a feasible solution by satisfying the packing con-
straints. Thus, the choice of the initial set of columns is arbitrary, and left to the
judgment of the user. In Chapter 4 we present detailed numerical results for the
implementation of this algorithm.
2.5.2 Heuristic method for a fixed number of facilities:
P-median location with greedy allocation.
Alternatively, a procedure decoupling the location and allocation components of
the problem can be used as a heuristic for the multiple facility problem. We exploit
the relationship between transportation costs and marginal hydrogen production
profits, and use a cost-minimization linear problem to identify a set of reasonably
located facilities. Then, we address the allocation component by using the methods
described in §2.4.1. Because the allocation for each facility will be determined sep-
arately, we need to eliminate infeasible global allocations (those not satisfying the
disjoint set condition from the original formulation or, equivalently, the convexity
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constraints in the column generation form) by removing nodes that are assigned to
more than one facility.
The p-median problem (Mirchandani 1990, Daskin 1995) for G = (N, A) can
be expressed as
Min
S,y⊆N
∑
j
DS j t¯y j |S j (2.9)
s.t.
⋃
j
S j ⊆ N; S i
⋂
S j = {∅},∀i , j; |S| = p
y j ∈ S j, ∀ j
Although the general p-median problem is NP-hard, for a fixed value of p the
problem is polynomial-time solvable (Garey and Johnson 1979), and there are nu-
merous algorithms available commercially to solve the problem with relative effi-
ciency for reasonably-sized instances. The heuristic is defined as follows.
P-Median based heuristic:
Step 0 (Initialization): Set p.
Step 1 (Location): Solve p-median problem for G = (N, A) and p. Define
locations chosen in p-median solution as facility set F p.
Step 2 (Initial allocation): For each node j ∈ Fp, use hybrid procedure to solve
the allocation portion of the (SFMS), denote these subsets as S pj . Define allocation
variables θi j = 1 if i ∈ S Pj , and 0 otherwise.
Step 3 (Feasibility test): If resulting subsets are disjoint, then allocation is fea-
sible, go to Step 5. Else, determine the set Ip of infeasible nodes (i.e., find all i
such that
∑
j θi j > 1).
Step 4 (Duplicate reduction): Select node i ∈ Ip with largest demand, let
J pi = { j : θi j = 1} be the set of facilities currently serving i. Calculate lossi j =
ZMS ( j, S pj ) − ZMS ( j, S pj \ {i}). Assign node i to subset S pj with the maximum value
of lossi j. For all other nodes j ∈ J pi , update S pj ← S pj \ {i}. Remove i from Ip. If
Ip = {∅}, then proceed to Step 5, otherwise repeat Step 4 for next largest node in
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Ip.
Step 5 (Profit estimation): Current allocation [θi j]n×p is feasible. Calculate total
expected profits as zp =
∑
j ZMS ( j, S
p
j ). 
There are two important observations regarding this heuristic. First, the procedure
itself has two phases of approximation: (a) the initial allocations are not guaran-
teed to be optimal solutions to their respective single facility problem even if the
other co-existing subsets were not considered, and (b) the duplicate reduction pro-
cess (Step 4) involves greedy selection of the node to treat and the facility to which
the treated node will be assigned. Thus, the procedure will, at best, provide some
lower bound for the producer’s expected profits. This bound, however, might not
be tight, but could serve as a starting point for speeding up large instances of the
branch-and-price procedure by providing an improved set of starting columns.
Second, note that fixing the value of p does not necessarily mean all p facilities
will be opened, as some chosen sites from the p-median solution might have an
empty set of allocation subsets with positive profits; i.e., if the base subset S j = { j}
has negative profits, then any other subset will do so as well. Further work may
focus on improving approximation algorithms for the (MFMS) for both fixed and
arbitrary number of facilities.
2.6 Numerical Tests: Subset Formation Heuristics
for (SFMS)
We present computational results for the solution procedures suggested for the
(SFMS), as a base for comparison of performance, relevant due to its structural
equivalence to the pricing problem of the (MFMS) and (MFPA).
As reference, all instances of the problems were implemented using a server
with a Xeon processor, with 2.93 GHz and 3 GB RAM. Algorithms were pro-
grammed using Mathematica, by Wolfram Research, version 7.0.1. However, we
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place little emphasis on optimizing the computational performance of the algo-
rithms, and the running times presented are for showing relative performance be-
tween the proposed procedures, and (whenever reasonable) with respect to enumer-
ation.
The tests were split into two groups. The first, with graphs of sizes n =
{6, 10, 15} set over a square surface of 100 × 100 km (roughly the area of Con-
necticut), serves as a control group to verify the performance of the heuristics
against verifiable optimal results obtained through enumeration. Demand node
locations and weights were generated randomly. Relative weights were then ad-
justed to reflect physical demand for hydrogen. The rest of the parameters are as
follows: pE ∼ N(0.05, 0.1), R ∼ U(0, 100000), Q(C j) = 5 + 0.01C1.5j , e = 0.01871,
m = 0.079, w = 0.038, and pH = 3.5. The results for this first group are summa-
rized in Table 2.3. Note that the running times shown on the table correspond to
a single node’s allocation problem. Thus, the total time required for selecting the
optimal location would then be (on average) n times larger than those shown. The
optimality gaps shown are estimated based only on suboptimal instances, thus the
average gap including optimal instances would have been substantially lower.
The hybrid heuristic achieved optimality in all but one of the instances (in the
interest of full disclosure, the greedy heuristic did find the corresponding optimal
allocation in this instance). The performance of the greedy heuristic worsened
(both in percentage of optimal solutions reached, as well as the average gap of
suboptimal instances) when the number of nodes increased.
The second group, with n = 50, allows for comparisons between the heuristics
for cases where exhaustive enumeration is not reasonable. These graphs were set
on square surfaces of two areas: 100×100 km, and 800×800 km (roughly the size
of France). In the case of the larger surface, hydrogen price was set at pH = 4.0
e/kg to partially compensate for the increased distances. The results for this second
group are presented in Table 2.4.
As we don’t have a validated optimal solution, the gap values for each proce-
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dure are measured with respect to the best solution achieved across the three heuris-
tics, and only computed for those instances where that specific procedure does not
match the best solution. In general, all heuristics fared much better in the case of
the larger surface, converging to the same solution in all but one case. The main
reason is the effect of longer distances in transportation costs (and, consequently, on
marginal hydrogen profitability), causing the tradeoffs between the different nodes
available for inclusion to be more evident. The reduction in computation time is
due to the larger surface inducing smaller-cardinality optimal subsets.
The hybrid heuristic was outperformed by the greedy heuristic in only one in-
stance for the smaller surface. Recall that the hybrid heuristic implemented for
these experiments used the base subset from the nearest-node solution; thus, for
this unique instance, the greedy solution was not reachable through an improving
path of single-node exchanges from the nearest-node solution, and may not be it-
self a global optimum. Still, the hybrid heuristic’s performance makes it suitable
for a large-scale implementation.
An expanded analysis of computational results for a larger instance of the de-
sign problem will be presented as part of a case study in §4.
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Chapter 3
Decision Under a Proportional
Allocation Policy
Here we will focus on the second distribution policy that the regulator can set in
place. In contrast with the local coverage focus of the market selection policy, this
second policy will focus on spatial coverage.
Definition 2. A proportional allocation policy consists of the following condi-
tions:
• The producer has to serve the entire set of demand locations N.
• Demand can be served partially within a node, but the proportion of demand
served (with respect to the node’s total demand) has to be the same across
the entire network.
We consider the proportional allocation policy to be preferred by a regulator
wishing to have technology adoption occur at the same rate throughout the network.
The contrast between the proportional allocation (presented in this chapter) and
market selection policy (addressed in Chapter 2) is significant. The results from
Ball et al. (2007) indicate the introduction of hydrogen fuel in densely populated
areas to have a significant impact in reducing infrastructure costs. This approach
is consistent with the roadmap for hydrogen infrastructure build-up planned by the
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European Union (European Commission 2012b), which focuses on a small number
of early user centers. Thus, a cost-centric analysis shifts towards local coverage
playing a more relevant role than spatial coverage.
Conversely, spatial coverage could potentially play a significant role in acceler-
ating adoption of the new technology at a more sustainable rate across a greater ge-
ographical area, through spatial spillover effects.1 Some studies present empirical
evidence of such spillover effects in the adoption of clean or improved technologies
in agricultural settings (Conley and Udry 2010, Lewis et al. 2011) and can influence
the overall effect of environmental policy (Banzhaf and Chupp 2010). Addition-
ally, equal access to renewable energy benefits is a key element in the sustainable
development of rural and less densely populated areas in Europe (OECD 2012).
Finally, spatial spillovers can be related to the reinforcing effect of learning-by-
doing, which has been addressed in the context of fuel-cell vehicles by Schwoon
(2006a,b). A wider adoption on a geographical level might create enough mass
in a larger number of markets, with local learning dynamics playing a greater role
in increasing the share of vehicles adopting the new technology.2 The contrary
point of view has been offered by Farrell et al. (2003), suggesting that succesful
large-scale deployment of hydrogen as an alternative fuel shall be achieved with
greater likelihood if efforts were put in place towards achieving significant market
penetration in a single node or a geographically restricted area (i.e., a protected
niche), which would maximize societal learning effects while minimizing infras-
tructure costs and risks. We note such demand dynamics are out of the scope of this
thesis, but wished to highlight how the perceived benefit of these dynamics might
influence the regulator’s choice of distribution policy, and justifies considering both
policies to understand their effect on system behavior.
Inducing spatial coverage must come at a cost for the producer, which accentu-
1Spatial spillovers are externalities caused by neighboring agents. In the context of our problem,
the rate of adoption of a new technology within a region can be shaped by the presence of the
technology in neighboring areas.
2For a more expanded view on these issues, the reader may refer to the literature in social
learning and technology diffusion (Rogers 1995).
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ates the role of the regulator in creating appropriate incentive schemes that permit
a proper assessment of the trade-off between both types of coverage and the social
benefits associated to accelerated adoption or equal access to the new technology.
When the firm is subject to an external (regulatory or contractual) condition
requiring coverage of all demand nodes at a constant service level, production ca-
pacity implicitly becomes a decision variable for our problem. We first address the
producer’s decision under this new setting for single and multiple production sites.
3.1 Optimal Capacity Decision
We formulate the unconstrained capacity optimization problem (COP) for a firm
with a single renewable generation source, with a fixed production site at j serving
a set of nodes S j ⊆ N under a proportional allocation policy. Using the expected
profit formulation (2.4) we have:
(COP) Max
C j≥0
Πˆ j(C j) = KHj (t¯ j|S j)C jF
c
R(C j/e) + eK
H
j (t¯ j|S j)GR(C j/e) − Q(C j)
By Proposition 1, we know that for a single technology configuration, and fixed
facility location and service subset, the producer’s total expected profit function is
concave. Thus, a unique maximum for Πˆ j(C j) will exist and can be determined
using the first order conditions defined in (2.5). Let CIj be said maximum, then:
CIj = eF
−1
R
KHj (t¯ j|S j) − Q′(CIj)KHj (t¯ j|S j)

The profit function is illustrated in Figure 3-1. The value CIj can be obtained
with relative ease by a search procedure such as Newton’s method (Bertsekas
1999). This result can clearly be related to the newsvendor problem (Arrow et
al. 1951), where the fraction between the brackets is analogous to a critical frac-
tile balancing the cost of overbuilding and underbuilding production capacity, with
the marginal costs of overbuilding capacity given by Q′(Cij), while the marginal
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Figure 3-1: Expected profit function for a fixed location and service subset.
costs of underbuilding capacity are given by KHj (t¯ j|S j) − Q′(CIj). The reader may
notice that in this expression there is no need for adjusting KHj (·) by the proportion
of time that hydrogen production is done, as is done in equation (2.7), as that ex-
pression is stated in terms of subset demand, while (2.4) captures the relationship
between output and capacity. It is only for the tranformation of the function from
capacity-dependent to demand-dependent where this adjustment is necessary.
Note the upper bound on hydrogen plant capacity is implicitly constrained by
the support of the energy supply distribution, which we do not assume here to
be restricted to any particular family of distributions, as long as it’s continuous
and twice differentiable. Since fixed capacity costs are only incurred if a positive
capacity is built, the proper solution to (COP) is C∗j = C
I
j if Πˆ j(C
I
j) > 0, and C
∗
j = 0
otherwise.
A further issue arises if the optimal solution to (COP) results in an output that
exceed what would be the desired demand. In the typical newsvendor model, the
optimal inventory/purchase level is determined by the demand distribution, and it
is implied the supplier has ample capacity. If this assumptions was not enforced,
the newsboy solution would only be optimal if it is smaller than the supplier’s
capacity, and if the supplier’s capacity is insufficient to satisfy the optimal quantity
then the highest profits would be achieved at the upper bound of the supplier’s
capacity. Conversely, in our model, the optimal capacity to be built is dependent
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on the supply distribution. The solution is not completely independent on demand,
as demand acts as a constraint, and can be formalized as min{DS j , H¯ j(CIj)}. In
the analysis shown above we have dealt with the unconstrained problem, which is
equivalent to assuming demand is large enough to assure that the natural constraint
placed by the support of the energy supply distribution is tighter than that set by an
exogenous upper bound on demand. This assumption does not affect the validity
of the newsvendor-type solution shown above, but rather allows us to understand
properly the dynamics of producer’s profits with respect to system capacity in an
unconstrained setting, while noting that the adjustment to a constrained setting
requires only a comparison of two values
3.2 Locating a Single Facility on the Network
We extend upon the previous model by considering that the firm wishes to choose
the location y ∈ G and the capacity level C∗y of a single facility to serve the entire
set of demand nodes N. This problem is formulated as follows:
(SFPA) ZPA(y,Cy) = Max
Cy≥0,y∈G
KHy (t¯y)
(
CyFcR(Cy/e) + eGR(Cy/e)
)
− Q(Cy)
Let j ∈ G be a fixed plant location with fixed capacity C j serving a set of nodes
S j, with t¯ j|N the demand-weighted unit transportation cost to the demand nodes in
N from j. The following property holds for the producer’s profit function.
Proposition 4. For a fixed subset and capacity value, ZPA( j, S j,C j) is decreasing
in t¯ j|S j .
Proof. For a given location j and allocation subset S j we have:
ZPA( j, S j) = DS j K
H
j (t¯ j|S j) − Q
(
C∗j(DS j)
)
Given capacity C j is fixed, only KH is a function of transportation costs t¯ j|S j , hence
proving
dZPA(t¯ j|S j )
dt¯ j
≤ 0 is equivalent to showing dK
H(t¯ j|S j )
dt¯ j|S j
≤ 0. The same applies for
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the proof of convexity. As β j(t¯ j|S j) = p
H−m− we − t¯ j|S j and δ j(t¯ j|S j) = e(pH−m− t¯ j|S j),
we have:
dKH(t¯ j|S j)
dt¯ j|S j
= −FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j)) − β j(t¯ j|S j) fpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
+
δ j(t¯ j|S j)
e
fpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j)) −
w
e
fpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j))
= −FpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j)) < 0
d2KH(t¯ j|S j)
dt¯2j|S j
= fpE (δ j(t¯ j|S j)) > 0
Thus, ZPA( j,C j) is decreasing and convex in t¯ j|S j for a fixed location j and
subset S j.  
We point out that, unlike Proposition 2, here the conditions for monotonicity
and convexity are unrestricted in the fixed parameters, as the properties described
in Proposition 4 are for a fixed capacity value that is not necessarily that required
to satisfy completely the demand of the subset. In other words, in the market selec-
tion case the condition of fully satisfying nodal demand forces the required capacity
(which is embedded in the value of Q(·)) to be indirectly a function of transporta-
tion costs, as the proportion of time dedicated to production for a fixed supply
distribution will be different. In the proportional allocation case, the capacity to be
built is chosen in an unconstrained manner, hence only the revenue term is affected
by transportation costs. When capacity is fixed, any change in transportation costs
will affect revenue solely within the estimations of parameter KHj (·).
We show that the (SFPA) problem can be separated into two distinct sequential
decisions. We define the 1-median problem as choosing the point j ∈ G which
minimizes the weighted transportation cost to the respective set of nodes N. It is
formally defined as
Min
j∈G
∑
i∈N
ti jDi.
Theorem 2. The optimal location y∗ for the (SFPA) problem is equivalent to the
1-median solution (y1M) on the same set of candidate locations.
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Proof. Let j′ ∈ G be a fixed location with associated weighted transportation cost
to the set of demand nodes N given by t¯ j′ |N , and C∗j′ that solves its corresponding
(COP) problem. Likewise, for a given j′′ ∈ G with transportation costs t¯ j′′ |N ≥ t¯ j′ |N ,
C∗j′′ is the solution to its (COP) problem.
Optimality of C∗j′ with respect to j
′ implies ZPA( j′,N,C∗j′) ≥ ZPA( j′,N,C∗j′′).
From Proposition 4 we have that for a fixed location j ∈ G and capacity value
C j, ZPA( j,N,C j) is decreasing in t¯ j|N . Then, for a fixed capacity value C∗j′′ we
have ZPA( j′,N,C∗j′′) ≥ ZPA( j′′,N,C∗j′′), as t¯ j′′ |N ≥ t¯ j′ |N , meaning that a lower-cost
location will provide higher profits than a higher-cost location for any given ca-
pacity; thus, all other parameters being equal, Proposition 4 holds for any pair of
distinct locations in the network. Let y∗ = argmin j∈G{t¯ j|N}. Then, ZPA(y∗,N,C∗y∗) ≥
ZPA( j,N,C∗j),∀ j ∈ G.
Recall t¯ j|S j =
∑
i∈S j Diti j∑
k∈S j Dk
. From the 1-median formulation, we have:
Min
j∈G
∑
i∈N
ti jDi = Min
j∈G
∑
k∈N
Dk t¯ j|N =
∑
k∈N
Dk Min
j∈G t¯ j|N
Thus, y1M ≡ argmin j∈G{t¯ j|N} ≡ y∗, meaning the solution to the 1-median problem
also selects the optimal location for the (SFPA) problem. 
Corollary 1. Under a proportional allocation policy, the optimal solution for the
(SFPA) can be obtained from y∗ = argmin j∈G{t¯ j|N}.
Proof. Follows from proof of Theorem 2. 
Corollary 2. An optimal location y∗ for (SFPA) can always be found in the set of
nodes N.
Proof. Follows from the node optimality theorem (Hakimi 1964). 
While Corollary 1 simplifies the problem to searching for the location with the
lowest weighted transportation cost value t¯ j, Corollary 2 reduces the search space
to the node set, thus the single facility location problem can be solved in O(n).
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The second step in the decision for the single facility problem involves select-
ing the optimal capacity level, which can then be obtained by solving the (COP)
problem for the chosen location y. By definition, the allocation of product to each
market i ∈ N will be a fraction ρi of expected production output H¯y(C∗y).
3.3 Locating Multiple Facilities on the Network
We extend the previous formulation to locating multiple facilities on the network
with each demand node restricted to being supplied from a single facility.
The placement of multiple facilities on the network is equivalent to finding a
feasible partition S of the set N maximizing total expected profits, where S j ∈ S
is the set of nodes served by a single facility located in the graph G[S j] induced by
that node subset.
The allocation proportions ρi = Di∑
k∈N Dk
are, by definition, determined with re-
spect to the entire network independent of the facility serving that demand node;
thus, when capacity is under control of the firm, an exogenous condition is required
to assure the ratio of produced and required hydrogen to be maintained across sub-
sets. Let ρS j =
∑
i∈S j ρi be the proportion of demand corresponding to subset S j,
and Cy j the production capacity to be made available at the single facility serv-
ing that same subset, with C the vector of such capacities. Additionally, define
CN =
∑
j Cy j as the total production capacity in the network. We can then formu-
late the multiple facility location-capacity decision as the following combinatorial
problem:
(MFPA) ZPA(y,S,C) = Max
S,C∈R|S|+ ,y∈G
|S|∑
j=1
Πˆy j(y j, S j,Cy j) (3.1)
s.t.
⋃
j
S j = N; S i
⋂
S j = {∅},∀i , j
y j ∈ S j, ∀ j
Cy j = ρS jCN , ∀ j
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The first set of conditions define a feasible partition; while the second group re-
quires each subset to be served from within its member nodes. The last set of
constraints enforces the proportional allocation policy. As all plants share a single
stochastic energy source, and facility costs are increasing in capacity, it is assured
that no location will have more capacity than that required to comply with the pro-
portional allocation policy, resulting in the last set of constraints. Note this formu-
lation is for an arbitrary number of production sites. Just as in the market selection
case, we can represent an exogenously-defined number of facilities through a par-
tition cardinality condition. Let H¯N(CN) = CN FcR(CN/e) + eGR(CN/e) represent
the total expected output of the hydrogen production network. Then the following
results can be derived.
Proposition 5. For the (MFPA) we have:
(i) The producer’s expected profit function for the (MFPA) can be stated as a
function of a single capacity value CN , as
ZPA(y,S,CN) = MaxS,CN∈R+,y∈G H¯N(CN)
∑
j
ρS j K
H(t¯y j |S j) −
∑
j
Q(ρS jCN) (3.2)
(ii) Given a partition S, the optimal production capacity vector C for the
(MFPA) can be obtained by solving the (COP) for a single capacity CN using the
expression
CN = e F−1R
∑ j ρS j KHj (t¯ j|S j) −∑ j ρS j Q′(ρS jCN)∑
j ρS j K
H
j (t¯ j|S j)

and allocating a capacity Cy j = ρS jCN to the facility serving each subset S j.
Proof. (i) From the proportional supply constraint in (3.1) we have that the global
production capacity can be stated as CN =
∑
S j∈SCS j . Let H¯N(CN) = CN F
c
R(CN/e)+
eGR(CN/e) represent the total expected output of the hydrogen production net-
work. Then, by rearranging terms and replacing the individual facility capacities
by ρS jCN , we can restate (3.1) as (3.2).
(ii) Total expected hydrogen output H¯N(CN) is nondecreasing and concave in
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global capacity (CN). For a given partition S, the vector (ρS 1 , . . . , ρS p) is fixed.
Thus,
∑
j=1,...,p Q(ρS jCN) is a convex increasing function of CN , which satisfies our
definition of (COP), thus the solution procedure presented for the (COP) will solve
the capacity problem for a fixed partition of the (MFPA). 
Capacity costs Q(ρS jCN) are driven both by total network capacity, and by the
proportion of demand assigned to each subset. For that reason, a partition providing
highest contribution to profits (i.e. maximizing the first term) might not provide
maximum operating profits due to a more costly allocation of capacity costs (in the
special case where capacity costs are linear and the number of facilities p is fixed,
maximizing operating and net profits are equivalent problems). We establish nodal
optimality compliance for the multiple facility problem.
Theorem 3. The set of optimal locations for the (MFPA) can be found in the set of
demand nodes (y∗ ⊆ N).
Proof. Assume (S′, y′,C′N) is the optimal solution to (MFPA) and y′ (the set of
optimal locations) includes at least one component yk outside of the set of nodes
(i.e., yk ∈ A). Leaving all other locations in y′ and their served subsets fixed, by
Corollary 2 there exists a nodal location yk ∈ S k which produces higher expected
profits for subset S k and, in turn, higher total expected profits for the (MFPA) given
the profits from all other subsets remain unchanged. This procedure can be iterated
for sequentially eliminating other non-nodal components. The existing optimal
capacity C′N is feasible for the new set of locations, hence any optimal capacity
C′′N , C
′
N obtained from the nodal solution will result in profits at least as high as
the non-nodal solution. Thus, for every instance of the (MFPA), there exists a profit
maximizing set of locations y∗ ⊆ N. 
Corollary 3. For a given partition S, the set of optimal locations y∗ will be defined
by {y1, . . . , yp}, with y j = argmini∈S j{t¯i}.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 1 and Theorem 3. 
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By Proposition 5 and Corollary 3, the last two sets of constraints in (3.1) will
necessarily be satisfied due to the structure of the problem and the behavior of the
producer’s profit function, even if they are not explicitly included in the formula-
tion. The optimality of the 1-median solution for the single facility problem raises
an equivalent question for the special case of locating p > 1 facilities; namely,
whether the solution to a p-median problem based on transportation costs ti j is op-
timal for the location of p facilities in the (MFPA) problem. Unlike the (MFMS),
the (MFPA) shares with the p-median problem the condition that all nodes in the
network shall be served. The p-median problem (Mirchandani 1990, Daskin 1995)
for G = (N, A) can be expressed as
Min
S,y⊆N
∑
j
DS j t¯y j |S j
s.t.
⋃
j
S j ⊆ N; S i
⋂
S j = {∅},∀i , j; |S| = p
y j ∈ S j, ∀ j
Although the general p-median problem is NP-hard, for a fixed value of p the
problem is polynomial-time solvable (Garey and Johnson 1979), and there are
numerous algorithms available to solve the problem with relative efficiency for
reasonably-sized instances. For that matter, its equivalence to the (MFPA) for a
fixed number of facilities would be relevant for simplifying the problem’s solu-
tion complexity. We show that the two problems are not equivalent by means of a
counterexample.
Let n = 6 and ρi = 16 , with Figure 3-2 depicting such a network and the asso-
ciated symmetric transportation cost matrix [ti j]. For illustrative purposes, KH has
been estimated as KH(t¯ j|S j) =
10
t¯ j|S j
, capacity costs as Q(CN) = 5 + 0.1
∑
k(ρS kCN)
3,
and expected production output as H¯N(CN) =
√
CN . The reader can easily ver-
ify these expressions satisfy KH(·) being convex decreasing in transportation costs
(Proposition 4), our assumption of Q(·) being convex increasing on CN , and H¯N(·)
being concave nondecreasing on CN . The p-median and (MFPA) solutions for
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Figure 3-2: Counterexample of p-median optimality: Network depiction and
transportation cost matrix.
Figure 3-3: Counterexample of p-median optimality: (PMED) and (MFPA) solutions.
p = 2 are shown in Table 3.1. The first column shows the resulting partition,
with the facility nodes in bold. Due to the symmetry in transportation costs, there
are multiple location choices yielding the same objective value; the result presented
was chosen to highlight that even when the chosen locations were the same, the al-
location (partitioning) had a significant impact in firm profits. The second and third
columns show the values of the p-median and (MFPA) objectives for the resulting
optimal partitions. The last column indicates the optimal capacity level for each
resulting partition.
Not only is the p-median solution not optimal for the (MFPA), but the p-median
solution results in 40% lower expected profits than the corresponding (MFPA) so-
lution.
There are some key differences between both problems. First, the convexity of
marginal hydrogen profits KH(·) causes marginal changes in average transportation
Objective Partition ZPMED ZPA C∗N(S, y)
(PMED) {1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6} 0.769 21.468 5.415
(MFPA) {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}, {5} 1.436 35.963 5.198
Table 3.1: Counterexample of p-median optimality: Result summary.
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costs to have a different effect on contribution to profits across subsets; specifically,
the profitability of subsets with relatively small average delivery cost t¯y j |S j is more
sensitive to changes in transportation costs resulting from including or excluding
a node from the subset. Second, the difference in profitability associated to the
assignment of a node to a subset (both by its effect on contribution and capacity
costs) means that, as opposed to the p-median problem where the number of alter-
native solutions is limited to the number of combinations nCp, the set of possible
solutions for the (MFPA) extends to all possible partitions of N. An exact proce-
dure involving enumeration of all possible partitions would not be feasible even for
problems of relatively small size –the set partitioning problem is NP-complete.
To address the (MFPA) problem we have evaluated different approaches. One
such approach was based on Lagrangian relaxation. This method, however, proved
impractical as the complexity of the resulting relaxed problem was not reduced with
respect to the original problem, as it happens with the UFLP and p-median prob-
lems. The next section approaches this problem making use of column generation
(Dantzig and Wolfe 1960). The strong connection between Lagrangean relaxation
and column generation has been well studied (Nemhauser and Wolsey 1999); still,
in this case, the implementation of both methods differs greatly, given the structure
of the profit function.
3.3.1 Exact Method for Fixed Service Level: Branch-and-Price
When the value for network production capacity (CN) is fixed, we can reformulate
the (MFPA) as a partitioning problem (Balas and Padberg 1976). Since there is a
direct correspondence between capacity and production output, we can relate net-
work capacity directly to a desired network-wide service level; i.e., the fraction of
each market’s demand that can be satisfied. Thus, an exact method can be derived
to optimally design the production-distribution network for hydrogen production
given a target (local) demand service level φ ∈ [0, 1].
The problem’s column generation form is then a variant of the set partitioning
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formulation established in Barnhart et al. (1998). Since every subset in an optimal
solution to the (MFPA) necessarily satisfies the 1-median property (Corollary 3),
then each subset is characterized by a unique column, and the set of facility lo-
cations is fully defined by the underlying partition subsets. Thus, a more refined
version of the set partitioning problem can be used for defining our master problem
(Minoux 1987), which will be as follows.
(CGPA) Max
λ
∑
k
zkλk (3.3)
s.t.
∑
k
θikλk = 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
λk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k ∈ ω
where
zk = DˆS j K
H
j (t¯ j) − Q(C∗j(DˆS j)),
with DˆS j = φDS j representing the hydrogen demand adjusted for the required local
service level, while θik maintains the definition established in the previous section.
For a given potential location j ∈ N we have the corresponding pricing subproblem:
Max
S j
DˆS j K
H
j (t¯ j) − Q(C∗j(DˆS j)) +
∑
i∈S j
µi
with µi ≤ 0 the dual variable of the ith convexity constraint from the master prob-
lem. Likewise, an optimal solution is assured if all subsets resulting from solving
the n pricing subproblems yield corresponding negative increased profits. The col-
umn generation algorithm presented in §2.5.1 is suitable for implementation for the
(MFPA) given a network capacity / service level value has been fixed, noting that
for Step 1 the new definition of zk shall be used, and that the relaxed problem to be
solved in Step 2 corresponds to the formulation (CGPA). Solutions to this problem
for a fixed capacity value enable us to compare the effect of the proportional allo-
cation policy on the producer’s profits; in other words, obtain a monetary value for
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the impact of the regulator enforcing equity in the access to the new technology.
We use this algorithm to contrast the results from both policies in §4.
3.3.2 Heuristic Procedures for Endogenous Capacity Decision
The branch-and-price procedure described in §3.3.1 is appropriate when network
capacity is a prior to the solution of the problem. A stark contrast of the two dis-
tribution policies –market selection and proportional allocation— is the producer’s
ability to choose its optimal capacity (ergo, expected output) level. However, the
solution to the capacity optimization problem presented in §3.1 is applicable only
for a fixed partition. For simultaneously optimizing network design and capacity,
a more involved procedure would need to be put in place that iteratively optimizes
capacity based on improved network solutions. Although not the main focus of this
thesis, we explain two procedures to address this variant of the problem.
The first (naive) approach involves repeatedly solving the fixed service level
problem described in §3.3.1, for a large set of values of φ. The precision of the re-
sulting solution will largely depend on the number of service level scenarios solved
(or, conversely, the distance between successive choices of φ). Even if a large set
of problems are solved, in this naive implementation the maximum profit solution
is not even guaranteed to be a local optimum. To obtain a true local optimum,
the fixed service level solution achieving the highest expected profits should be
subjected to the corresponding capacity optimization problem.
The main advantage of this approach is its ease of implementation; and progres-
sive estimation might allow the detection of patterns in profits, which would allow
narrowing the space for locating the (nearly) optimal solution (one such pattern,
for instance, involves that if a partition is optimal for two separate service levels, it
will also be optimal for every φ value in between; thus, when a region of focus has
been identified where the optimal solution is considered to be located, then such a
repeated optimal partition would guarantee the global optimum is found.
A second approach is more involved in nature, but its inner structure is based
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on the same column generation algorithm used in the fixed service level (MFPA)
problem. We proceed to define this approach.
Let λ be an optimal solution to (CGPA), and µi the dual variable associated to
each convexity constraint. The following procedure solves the location-allocation
problem for a fixed capacity value and then optimizes capacity for the resulting
partition. Since for the new capacity a different partition might provide higher ex-
pected profits to the producer, the algorithm iteratively repeats this process until
convergence to a local maximum. To test for better available solutions, a new
capacity value is set from the unexplored space. A large number of location-
allocation problems would need to be solved to cover a significant portion the
capacity space and increase the guarantee of a global optimum being achieved.
Define  as a small positive number, and α ∈ (0, 1). Parameter ϑmax defines the
maximum number of iterations that will be allowed without finding an improve-
ment in expected profits. Step coefficient α defines how much the capacity value
will be perturbed to continue the procedure from a found local optimum. Smaller
values for α will result in more exhaustive exploration of the capacity domain,
same as a greater value of ϑmax. Because of these arbitrary rules which guarantee
termination, the algorithm is not guaranteed to find a (globally) optimal solution.
Modified branch-and-price algorithm for (MFPA):
Step 0 (Initialization): Set iteration limit ϑmax. Define initial set of n+1 columns
ω as all singleton sets and N. Set initial capacity C1N = (eR¯) (where  is a small
positive value). Set S0 = {∅}, z∗ = z0 = 0, and τ = 1.
Step 1 (Relocation): For each column k ∈ ω, locate facility at the 1-median
solution, i.e., yk = argmini∈S k{t¯i|S k}; calculate zτk = ZPA(yk, S k,CτN).
Step 2 (Relaxed problem): Solve (CGPA) for zτk, ω, C
τ
N .
Step 3 (Insertion): Based on dual variables µi, solve the following pricing sub-
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problem for each designated base node j:
Max
S j
ZPA( j, S j,CτN) +
∑
i∈S j
µi
Resulting nonempty solutions from pricing subproblems are added to set ω, re-
turn to Step 1. If no new columns are formed with positive increased profits, then
proceed to Step 4.
Step 4 (Branching): If λk ∈ {0, 1},∀k ∈ ω then Sτ is optimal partition for
(MFPA) for capacity CτN , go to Step 5; else, choose one element λk ∈ (0, 1) for
branching, return to Step 2.
Step 5 (Validation of local optimality): If Sτ = Sτ−1, a local optimum has been
found, set Cτ+1N = C
τ
N + α(eR¯ −CτN), and go to step 7; otherwise proceed to Step 6.
Step 6 (Capacity optimization): Obtain C∗N for the partition Sτ by solving:
C∗N(Sτ) = eF−1R

∑
S j∈Sτ ρS j
(
KH(t¯y j |S j) − Q′(ρS jCN)
)∑
S j∈Sτ ρS j KH(t¯y j |S j)

Set Cτ+1N = C
∗
N(S). Calculate zτ = ZPA(yτ,Sτ,Cτ+1N ). If zτ > z∗, then z∗ ← zτ,
ϑ = 1; otherwise ϑ = ϑ + 1.
Step 7 (Parameter updating): If ϑ = ϑmax, stop; otherwise τ← τ + 1, calculate
zτk = Z
PA(yk, S k,CτN),∀k ∈ ω; go to Step 2. 
The parameter ϑmax defines the maximum number of iterations that will be allowed
without finding an improvement in total expected profits. Step coefficient α defines
how much the capacity value will be perturbed to avoid having the algorithm get
caught indefinitely in a local optimum. Smaller values for α will result in more
exhaustive exploration of the capacity domain, same as a greater value of ϑmax.
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Chapter 4
Incentive and Policy Implications:
Case Study on Spain
We apply our methodology for the multiple facility problem under a market selec-
tion setting on a realistic network representing a potential future market for hydro-
gen in Spain. We use this practical setting to understand and discuss the impact of
incentive and policy choices on the design of a hydrogen distribution network.
We use the 50 largest cities in Spain as our demand nodes, a list of which is
presented in Appendix A. The total target population is 16.4 million people, which
amounts to a yearly hydrogen demand of 204,000 kg of hydrogen per hour at 100%
local market share (i.e., full replacement of all motor vehicles by fuel cell vehicles).
As the renewal rate of the passenger vehicle fleet is approximately 5.4% (European
Commission 2012c), we consider it reasonable to use 5% and 20% as short- and
medium-term projected market shares for hydrogen-powered vehicle adoption. We
point out that Brey et al. (2006) use 15% as an overall target in a medium-term
(6 year) horizon, using intermediate targets of 5% and 10% for the earlier stages
(2 and 4 years) of technology rollout. Hydrogen demand was derived from demo-
graphic and transportation data available from the European Commission (2012c),
considering an average hydrogen fuel efficiency of 78.8 km/kgH2 (U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy 2007), resulting in respective target hydrogen demands of 10,209
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and 40,836 kg per hour for 5% and 20% share of the vehicle inventory.
Energy supply and mean price data was obtained from European Commission
(2012c) and OMEL (2011), and we assumed the standard deviation of electric-
ity prices to be 40% of the mean price. We use the Euclidean distances between
demand nodes, and an average cost of 0.00743 e/kg to obtain our transportation
cost values. The rest of the parameters (here defined for a one-hour period) are
gathered from the H2A and HyWays frameworks for hydrogen infrastructure de-
velopment (U.S. Department of Energy 2009c, European Commission 2012b), and
from estimations done as part of the SPHERA project and the existing literature
on hydrogen pathways (e.g., Levene et al. 2007). The following parameters remain
fixed throughout the case study: R ∼ U[0, 1008334] [kWh], pE ∼ N(0.039, 0.0156)
[e/kWh], w = 0.01 e/kWh, m = 0.079 e/kg, and Q(C j) = 80 + 0.50C1.1j .
4.1 Base Scenarios
We present base scenarios based on the following parameter changes to evaluate
their effect on the resulting production-distribution network: three values for hy-
drogen prices (3.25, 3.5, 4.0) to represent the willingness of the regulator to in-
centivize production, two levels of market share (5%, 20%) to represent the rate
of adoption of the new technology, and two production efficiencies (0.01871 and
0.02252 kg/kWh) to model current and potential future yield from the electrolysis
process. We implement the branch-and-price algorithm presented in §2.5.1 under
a market selection policy, with the results summarized in Table 4.1.
Intuitively, expected profits and coverage reflect a nondecreasing behavior with
respect to hydrogen prices and production efficiency. Results indicate largely de-
centralized production, more evidently in the higher market share scenarios, where
previously modest markets become attractive for local electrolysis rather than hy-
drogen transport from a nearby location. We can use a mapping tool to illustrate
the network configuration, an example of which (specifically, the result of base
scenario 7) is shown in Figure 4-1. As can be observed, production is significantly
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Figure 4-1: Spatial layout of resulting network for base scenario 7. In this result, 19
facilities are opened to serve 35 markets covering 86.5% of estimated demand.
decentralized due to the distance between the population centers. Only some small
clusters are formed in regions where the combination of proximity and demand size
allows for profitable delivery. We can also see some unserved nodes that are closer
to their nearest facility than some served nodes are to theirs. The main reasoning
is that the compounded effect of transportation costs and relative size of the nodes
makes the threshold for serviceable distance a function of subset size. Finally, we
see an instance of a node served by a facility other than its nearest one (in the cen-
tral portion of the map, specifically the node representing Alcala de Henares being
served from the Mostoles facility rather than from Madrid), which is a situation we
proved can exist in our model, in opposition to pure cost-minimization models with
linear costs such as the p-median problem.
However, to achieve succesful large-scale deployment, the regulator might need
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to establish an incentive scheme for the producer to assume the risk of investing in
capacity, while maintaining hydrogen prices competitive with traditional fuels. It
is out of the scope of this thesis to discuss which mechanisms are better for this
purpose, but we will briefly present how these incentives could be incorporated to
our model, and how this model can be used in comparing such incentive schemes.
4.2 Effect of Incentive Schemes under a Market Se-
lection Policy
We evaluate two different dimensions of monetary incentives for hydrogen pro-
duction. First, having access to a higher wholesale hydrogen price pH increases
both coverage and producer’s profits. Consumers, on the other hand, would more
quickly adopt the new technology if the retail price pT is competitive enough with
traditional fuels to offset the higher cost of a new vehicle (i.e., establishing a price
equal to that of current fuels might not be sufficient). Thus, the gap between these
two prices –at the plant and at the pump— minus any retail costs might need to be
covered by the regulator. We refer to this gap pH − pT − cret as the price subsidy.
In contrast, the regulator may cover a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of the capacity costs.
We refer to this incentive as the equipment subsidy. Thus, the producer’s profit
function will become:
ZMS (y,S) = Max
S,y∈G
∑
j
DS j K
H
j (t¯y j |S j) − (1 − ξ)
∑
j
Q
(
C∗j(DS j)
)
It is evident the regulator’s cost function from the combination of these incen-
tiives is (pH − pT − cret)+ ∑ j DS j + ξQ (C∗j(DS j)), thus costs are nondecreasing in
both ξ and pH.
We set a target retail price for hydrogen of pT = 3.50 e/kg, which would
be competitive with existing fuels to offset the additional costs associated to ve-
hicle replacement by consumers. For comparison, note that average retail price
77
for gasoline fuel in Spain for 2011 was 1.318 e/l, or about 5 e/gallon (European
Commission 2012a). We also reserve 0.25 e/kg for the cost of retail distribution,
which should be sufficient to cover for amortized capital, O&M costs and operat-
ing margin of filling stations assuming that existing gas stations can be adapted for
hydrogen delivery, thus land costs can be ignored (as a reference, Yang and Ogden
2007 estimate retail point costs excluding land at about $0.20/kg for non-pipeline
stations). Thus, for pH > 3.25e/kg, the regulator will cover the difference between
the wholesale and consumer prices.
We can then compare the cost for the regulator (indirectly, for society) of
achieving a certain level of coverage for an initial market share of 5%, given differ-
ent combinations of pH and ξ. Figure 4-2 graphically represents the coverage level
(as a percentage of the target demand) for these incentive schemes, while Table
4.2 presents a comparison of costs incurred by the regulator to achieve full cover-
age of demand (with an annual production of 89.4M kg), where pHξ is the lowest
wholesale price for a given value of ξ that achieves full coverage (due to the mono-
tonicity of the regulator’s cost function with respect to pH, this is also the lowest
cost alternative for the regulator given an equipment subsidy level).
Each gallon of gasoline that is replaced by an equivalent amount of hydrogen
fuel reduces carbon dioxide emissions by approximately 8.75 kg. Annual produc-
tion with full geographic coverage at 5% market share would result in over 780,000
tonnes of reduced CO2 emissions. Thus, we can also present an estimated cost per
ton of reduced carbon dioxide emissions, as a way of measuring the potential im-
pact of clean hydrogen, which is approximately 52 e/TCO2 using an incentive
scheme based only on equipment (and not end-product price) subsidy.
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Figure 4-2: Coverage as a function of hydrogen price (pH) and equipment subsidy (ξ).
4.3 Effect of Distribution Policy Choice on Network
Design and Producer Profitability
We can contrast the firm’s performance under both distribution policies. The mar-
ket selection policy enforces full local coverage of demand, but does not enforce
full spatial coverage across the network. The proportional allocation, on the other
hand, enforces full spatial coverage and equal (but not full) local coverage across
the network.
We can compare firm profitability in the presence of each of these two poli-
cies, and measure the impact of inducing spatial equity in the deployment of the
new technology for both the firm and the regulator. Given a solution (S, y) to the
(MFMS) problem, we use the resulting spatial coverage (i.e., the total weight of
the nodes served) and set it as the local service level parameter φ for the (MFPA);
hence, we can contrast the policies for a setting with the same overall level of pro-
duction. Fixing ξ = 0.20, we compare the policies for a hydrogen price range
pH ∈ [2.95, 3.55]. Figure 4-3 shows the behavior for the optimal number of plants
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and the expected yearly profits. The proportional allocation constraint has a signif-
icant effect in firm profitability, especially at low levels of adoption, where the firm
is forced to forego service to significant portions of highly attractive markets, and
divert output towards less attractive nodes. This effect is also evident in the fact that
production under the market selection policy is highly focused on a small number
of large markets for low hydrogen prices, while the spatial distribution of popula-
tion centers induces opening a significantly larger number of production facilities
for serving the same volume of demand under a proportional allocation policy. For
instance, at a hydrogen price of 3.25e/kg, the proportional allocation policy causes
the optimal number of electrolysis plants to increase from 19 to 28 to achieve the
same total expected production volume, with the firm suffering a 37.7% reduction
in profits, and the regulator incurring 4.9% greater equipment subsidy costs (there
is no subsidy of end-product price) due to the larger number of plants requiring
fixed investment. In the cases where negative profits results from a proportional al-
location policy being in place, the firm would simply decide not to enter the market
and obtain zero profits; however the actual expected profits are shown to hint the
existence of a threshold price for hydrogen for which a firm would enter a market
regulated under a proportional allocation policy and a certain level of equipment in-
centives. For the case shown, the minimum price for feasible production under the
proportional allocation policy is approximately 0.20 e/kg than the corresponding
price from the market selection case.
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Figure 4-3: Comparison of distribution policies as a function of hydrogen price: (a)
Number of facilities; (b) Yearly profits. The continuous line shows the fraction of total
demand covered for reference.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Extensions
5.1 Summary of Results
This thesis has addressed the profit maximization problem faced by a firm with re-
newable energy generation capabilities, when it has the option to produce hydrogen
through grid-connected electrolysis for distribution to consumers using hydrogen
as an alternative fuel. We show the properties of the producer’s profit function,
and provide an exact method based on column generation for solving this problem
under two alternative distribution policies.
As a way to ground our work in a practical context, we also present a numerical
case study that extends previous research on a potential hydrogen supply chain for
Spain. Our results indicate a prevalence of decentralized production in the case
where the producer can select its markets for service, induced by the relatively
long distances between demand points, which is accentuated in high market share
and future efficiency scenarios. Additionally, at the current state of production
technology, our computational tests indicate that an incentive scheme centered on
reducing equipment and infrastructure costs for producers would result in a lower
cost for the regulator than an end-product price subsidy, when full spatial and local
coverage of demand are desired.
Our work, as far as we know, is the first network design model integrating
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energy supply and price uncertainty for a firm with dual wind generation and hy-
drogen production capabilities, and providing an exact solution method that is re-
markably efficient and adaptable to existing energy market data. This allowed us
to solve multiple scenarios to assess the trade-off between two dimensions of pro-
duction incentives.
The ability to leverage generation and storage capabilities to maximize profits
could prove crucial in increasing the feasibility of hydrogen as an alternative en-
ergy carrier, as well as improving the utilization of current (and future) renewable
generation infrastructures. Thus, we consider this a valuable tool both for firms
who aim to evaluate their network decisions, and also for policy-makers who wish
to design fair incentive systems for the production of clean energy. We show how
the model can be used to estimate the monetary cost (for the regulator) of emission
reduction derived from clean energy delivery for transportation, as well as the cost
of assuring equal adoption across a geographic area by means of a proportional
allocation policy. We do not attempt to make specific policy suggestions, but rather
provide a framework for stakeholders to have a more accurate representation of the
outcomes induced by a set of policies, and enabling a proper comparison to other
energy storage and delivery technologies.
5.2 Extensions
Many interesting directions arise for extending this work. First, other alternative
distribution policies may be explored to balance profitability (for the producer),
equity and social cost (for society), and incentive costs (for the regulator); for in-
stance, the inclusion of minimum and/or differentiated service levels per location.
Such policies might greatly affect the structure of the problem and require the use
of methodologies differing from those proposed in this thesis.
Second, our work is based on a zonal pricing scheme for electricity, an assump-
tion that could be relaxed to consider nodal (and possibly correlated) prices.
On the energy policy front, using the model for a more exhaustive analysis
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of pricing and regulation effects would be useful to further understand the ef-
fect of incentive schemes when technology and market parameters are subject to
change. Such changes could arise from improvements in electrolyzer or compres-
sion/liquefaction technology, price or availability of water for electrolysis (a rel-
evant matter in some geographic regions, Spain included), or long-term changes
in the stochastic behavior of energy prices caused by the introduction of storage
capabilities to the energy system; thus resulting in a framework for evaluating re-
source allocation in the development of clean energy carriers, including technol-
ogy development, production infrastructure, consumer incentive programs, supply
availability, and alternative carbon mitigation strategies.
A direct extension of our model in the field of policy design consists in in-
corporating carbon emission markets as part of the value functions of the parties
involved. If the producer is allowed to receive credit for emission reductions due
to displacement of fossil feedstocks from the transportation fuel mix, then the de-
pendence on regulator incentives (subsidies) for sustainable development of a hy-
drogen production-distribution infrastructure could be reduced.
U¨c¸tug˘ et al. (2011) perform a feasibility analysis incorporating carbon trading
for a hydrogen production plant using a methane reforming process. They show
that carbon trading can be a cost-effective financial tool for hydrogen production
plants during the first years of operation, when return of investment is low and
the risk assumed by producers is high. Additionally, the results from Aflaki and
Netessine (2012) indicate that carbon taxes by themselves might actually discour-
age investment in renewable energy capacity. Thus, it would be interesting to see
the effect of integrating hydrogen (as an end product, rather than only for storage
or load-shifting) in their framework to evaluate whether their perceived effect still
holds.
Finally, we treat facilities as price-taking, which is reasonable when network
congestion is not a significant factor (e.g., due to wind being more prevalent in
off-peak periods). As part of the goal of a storage technology is to increase the
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penetration of renewable power in energy markets, it is likely congestion issues
might merit consideration in high wind penetration markets.
Our intuition is that considering the location of generation facilities and net-
work congestion would create a need for some production capacity closer to the
wind farms, as such localized storage would punctually decouple the transmission
system from the hydrogen distribution system during congestion periods. With
wind farms usually located in sparsely populated areas, this localized production
might be profitable to serve niche segments of the population, such as smaller ur-
ban areas near wind farms that are normally left out of pilot alternative fuel plans,
creating a viable outlet for surplus generation in peak periods, while providing so-
cial value through adoption of a clean technology in areas otherwise ignored due
to their relatively small demand.
Another consequence of relaxing the price-taking assumption is the feedback
dynamics caused by an increase in renewable production due to the presence of
storage technologies (hydrogen or otherwise) when penetration of renewables is
high. Zhou et al. (2012) highlight this issue and suggest analyzing the combined
effect of multiple wind farms and storage facilities on electricity prices. Extending
our model to make electricity prices (a parameter affecting the location and capac-
ity decisions) dependent on total volume of storage via hydrogen would certainly
involve a more complex problem that would not be suitable for solution through the
methodologies suggested in this thesis. Given part of the purpose of energy stor-
age is increasing the viability of renewable generation projects, this relationship
deserves to be at least considered.
The usefulness of our model goes beyond the field of energy systems. Con-
sider a firm making a strategic production-distribution decision associated to an
assortment of goods requiring a shared (possibly perishable) input, where the input
itself can be sold to a market with price uncertainty, and where the end goods can
be obtained through production processes shared by subsets of products. Such a
setting bears some structural similarities to our problem. In that context, the loca-
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tion and capacity decisions relate to the selection of the transformation processes,
while the allocation problem would relate to how much of each capacity –if any–
would be assigned to each product, with transportation costs representing transfor-
mation costs for each process-product pair, and the market selection policy acting
as a filtering mechanism for the firm to choose which end-products to produce. The
model may be adapted to represent the prices of the different end-products, rather
than a unique price as in our case. In the context of different production technolo-
gies for industries with inputs of expensive (precious metals for semiconductors),
price-volatile (energy-intensive processes) or perishable nature (fresh produce with
longer-lasting but lower-value end-products), such a model could certainly be ap-
plicable.
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Appendix A
List of demand points for case study
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City, Province (1-25) City, Province (26-50)
Madrid, Madrid Jerez, Cadiz
Barcelona, Barcelona Pamplona , Navarra
Valencia, Valencia Fuenlabrada , Madrid
Seville, Seville Almeria, Almeria
Zaragoza, Zaragoza San Sebastian, Guipuzcoa
Malaga, Malaga Santander, Cantabria
Murcia, Murcia Burgos, Burgos
Bilbao, Viszcaya Burgos, Burgos
Cordoba, Cordoba Castello, Castello
Alicante, Alacant Alcorcon, Madrid
Valladolid, Valladolid Albacete, Albacete
Vigo, Pontevedra Salamanca, Salamanca
Gijon, Asturias Getafe, Madrid
L’Hospitalet De Llobregat, Barc. Logrono, La Rioja
A Corua˜, A Corun˜a Huelva, Huelva
Granada, Granada Badajoz, Badajoz
Vitoria, Alava Leon, Leon
Badalona, Barcelona Tarragona, Tarragona
Elx, Alacant Cadiz, Cadiz
Oviedo, Asturias Lleida, Lleida
Cartagena, Murcia Marbella , Malaga
Mostoles, Madrid Sta. Coloma De Gramenet, Barc.
Alcala De Henares, Madrid Mataro, Barcelona
Sabadell, Barcelona Jaen, Jaen
Terrassa, Barcelona DosHermanas, Seville
Table A.1: List of demand points.
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